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Zusatztext Besides the importance of its principal topic and the exciting inventiveness of the theory it elaborates, this book has quite a few further merits. The seven puzzles give it an engaging overall structure. Its theses and objections to competing positions are clearly stated, aptly illustrated, and ingeniously supported. The many subsidiary issues of language and mind that are taken up provide an illuminating and satisfying breadth and depth. And this is all conducted with the sly dry wit and relaxed elegance characteristic of its authors Informationen zum Autor R. M. Sainsbury taught at the University of Oxford, University of Essex, and University of London (where he was Susan Stebbing Professor of Philosophy) before coming to the University of Texas in 2002Michael Tye encountered philosophy at Oxford, and taught at Temple University, St Andrews, and the University of London before coming to Austin in 2003. He is Dallas TACA Centennial Professor in Liberal Arts Klappentext How can one think about the same thing twice without knowing that it's the same thing? How can one think about nothing at all (for example Pegasus, the mythical flying horse)? Is thinking about oneself special? One could mistake one's car for someone else's, but it seems one could not mistake one's own headache for someone else's. Why not? Zusammenfassung Sainsbury and Tye present a new theory, 'originalism', which provides natural, simple solutions to puzzles about thought that have troubled philosophers for centuries. They argue that concepts are to be individuated by their origin, rather than epistemically or semantically. Although thought is special, no special mystery attaches to its nature. Inhaltsverzeichnis Preface 1: The puzzles 2: Roads not taken 3: Overview of an originalist theory of concepts 4: The originalist theory defended and elaborated 5: Concept externalism, originalism and privileged access 6: The metaphysics of thought 7: The puzzles solved 8: Further applications: originalism and experience 9: Objections and replies References Index ...
