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In
Death, Dominance, and State-Building, Roger D. Petersen offers a definitive work on the course, conduct, and aftermath of the Iraq war. He uniquely combines an accessible analytical framework with detailed case studies that unpack the dynamics between the US military and various Shia and Sunni insurgents. The book covers the entire 2003-2023 period in Iraq, incorporating the insights and voices of US military personnel, Iraqi citizens, and even Iraqi insurgents. While it comprehensively covers the past in Iraq, it also draws lessons for the future of American military intervention.
Table des matières
- Section One: Framework
- Chapter One: Death, Dominance, and State-Building: The US in Iraq and the Future of American Intervention
- Chapter Two: Analytical Framework I: Roles and Strategy
- Chapter Three: Analytical Framework II: Mechanisms and Strategy
- Chapter Four: US Counterinsurgency Strategy and Practice
- Section Two: The Iraq Conflict 2003-2011
- Preview to Section II
- Chapter Five: Violence, State-Building, and the Sunni-Shia Cleavage
- Chapter Six: Ghazaliyah: Sunni Mobilization, Sectarian War, US Success and Failure
- Chapter Seven: Sadr City, the Mahdi Army, and the Sectarian Cleansing of Baghdad
- Chapter Eight: Mansour: The Failure to Mobilize Moderates
- Chapter Nine: The Failure to Establish Local Security
- Chapter Ten: Captain Wright Goes to Baghdad (co-written with Timothy Wright)
- Chapter Eleven: Anbar, 2003-2011: The Generation of a Community Mobilization Strategy (co-written with Jon Lindsay)
- Chapter Twelve: The Battle of Sadr City, 2008: Innovations in Urban Counterinsurgency
- Chapter Thirteen: The Surge: A Reconsideration
- Chapter Fourteen: Iraqi Kurdistan: Dual Cleavages and their Effect on War and State-Building
- Section Three: Iraq 2011-2020
- Preview to Section III
- Chapter Fifteen: Hawija: Explaining Sunni Resurgence
- Chapter Sixteen: The Third Iraq War
- Chapter Seventeen: Hybrid Actors: The Emergence and Persistence of the Popular Mobilization Forces
- Chapter Eighteen: How Minorities Make Their Way in Post-ISIS Iraq: The Case of Christian Militias in the Nineveh Plain (co-written with Matt Cancian)
- Chapter Nineteen: The Kurdistan Regional Governate Revisited: Death, War, Machinations, and Little Change
- Chapter Twenty: The Decline of Dominance Politics? Emotions and Institutions in Iraq Ten Years After the 2011 US Withdrawal
- Section Four: The Future of American Military Intervention
- Preview to Section IV
- Chapter Twenty-One: Findings and Lessons
- Chapter Twenty-Two: Constraints on Learning: The Influence of the Changing International System and US Domestic Politics
- Chapter Twenty-Three: The Future of American Military Intervention
- Appendices:
- Appendix A: Application of Framework to Classic Theories of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency
- Appendix B: An Application of the Framework to Review Recent Social Science Literature
- Bibliography
- Notes
- Index
A propos de l'auteur
Roger D. Petersen is the Arthur and Ruth Sloan Professor of Political Science. He holds BA, MA, and PhD degrees from the University of Chicago and has taught at MIT since 2001. Petersen focuses on within-state conflict and violence. He has written three books: Resistance and Rebellion: Lessons from Eastern Europe (2001), Understanding Ethnic Violence: Fear, Hatred, Resentment in Twentieth Century Eastern Europe (2002), and Western Intervention in the Balkans: The Strategic Use of Emotion in Conflict (2011). He teaches courses on military intervention, civil-military relations, politics and conflict in the Balkans and the Middle East, and emotions and politics.
Résumé
The definitive work on the course, conduct, and aftermath of the Iraq war.
In Death, Dominance, and State-Building, the eminent scholar of conflict Roger D. Petersen provides the first comprehensive analytic history of post-invasion Iraq. Although the war is almost universally derided as one of the biggest foreign policy blunders of the post-Cold War era, Petersen argues that the course and conduct of the conflict is poorly understood. He begins by outlining an accessible framework for analyzing complex, fluid, and violent internal conflicts. He then applies that framework to a variety of diverse case studies to break down the strategic interplay among the US military forces and Shia and Sunni insurgent organizations as it played out in Baghdad, Anbar, and Hawija. Highlighting the struggle for dominance between Shia and Sunni in Baghdad, Petersen offers a reconsideration of the Surge. He also addresses failures of state-building in Iraqi Kurdistan. Critically, he shows how the legacy of the US occupation and presence from 2003-2011 shaped Iraq's political and security contours from 2011-2023.
Comprehensive, analytically sophisticated, and subtle, this book draws lessons relevant to future American military interventions from what most regard as the US's most disastrous foreign policy adventure since Vietnam. The US cannot simply wish away insurgencies, which are always going to occur. The question is what the US and other great powers might do about them in the future.
Texte suppl.
The long-awaited study of the wars in Iraq across their full expanse from 2003 to 2020. Incisive, erudite, and revealing.
