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First published in 2000. This is Volume II of six in the Library of Philosophy series on the Philosophy of Science. Written in 1938, philosophical systems which employ logical methods almost exclusively would undoubtedly be expected to produce non-empirical results. If, however, logic is taken simply as a method of connecting meanings it is not difficult to reconcile logical methods with empirical results. If logical formular, in other words, assert nothing about the meanings of propositions, but simply show how such meanings are connected, then an empiricism based on a logical analysis of meanings is not inconsistent. This is what the Logical Positivists have attempted to do. This book looks at two areas: the foundations of a scientific method free from metaphysics, and the elimination of pseudo-concepts introduced by metaphysics into science and philosophy.
Table des matières
Introduction; Part 1 Logical Foundations; Chapter 1 Wittgenstein’s Theory of Meaning; Chapter 2 Logic and Mathematics; Part 2 Theory of Scientific Method; Chapter 3 Probability; Chapter 4 Induction; Chapter 5 The Nature of Natural Laws; Part 3 The Elimination of Metaphysics and The Positivistic Theory of Knowledge; Chapter 6 Elimination of Metaphysics; Chapter 7 Linguistic Solipsism; Chapter 8 The Positivistic Theory of Knowledge; Part 4 Radical Physicalism; Chapter 9 Logical Syntax of Languages; Chapter 10 Problems of Scientific Method and Philosophy in Terms of Logical Syntax; Chapter 11 The Physical Language; Chapter 12 Critique of Physicalism; Part 5 Conclusion; Chapter 13 An Estimate of the Viennese Circle; Chapter 14 The Possibility of an Alternative Theory of Language;
A propos de l'auteur
Julius Rudolph Weinberg
