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Why has there been uneven success in reducing air pollution even in the same locality over time? This book offers an innovative theorization of how local political incentives can affect bureaucratic regulation. Using empirical evidence, it examines and compares the control of different air pollutants in China-an autocracy-and, to a lesser extent, Mexico-a democracy. Making use of new data, approaches, and techniques across political science, environmental sciences, and engineering, Shen reveals that local leaders and politicians are incentivized to cater to the policy preferences of their superiors or constituents, respectively, giving rise to varying levels of regulatory stringency during the leaders' tenures. Shen demonstrates that when ambiguity dilutes regulatory effectiveness, having the right incentives and enhanced monitoring is insufficient for successful policy implementation. Vividly explaining key phenomena through anecdotes and personal interviews, this book identifies new causes of air pollution and proposes timely solutions. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.
Table des matières
1. Introduction: an inconvenient truth; 2. Theory of the political regulation wave; 3. Local governance in China; 4. The case of sulfur dioxide control; 5. The case of fine particulate matter control; 6. The tradeoffs of the political regulation wave; 7. Conclusion: rethinking governance.
A propos de l'auteur
Shiran Victoria Shen is a Stanford-trained political scientist and environmental engineer currently based at the Hoover Institution. Her research explores the intersections of political science, public policy, environmental sciences, and engineering, with a particular interest in how local politics influence environmental governance. This is her first book.
Résumé
Why has there been uneven success in reducing air pollution even in the same locality over time? This book offers an innovative theorization of how local political incentives can systematically affect bureaucratic regulation and empirically examines the control of different air pollutants in China and – to a lesser extent – in Mexico.
Préface
Offers an innovative theorization of how local political incentives impact bureaucratic regulation, using the case of air pollution control.
