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Zusatztext Maloney's theory is a valuable contribution to the philosophy of perception, admirable for its originality and for the breadth of philosophical and scientific work it synthesizes. Along with his book's interest for specialists, its systematic presentation of issues and positions prominent in recent philosophy and psychology of perception provides advanced nonspecialists with a useful introduction to the field. Informationen zum Autor J. Christopher Maloney is Professor of Philosophy and Cognitive Science at the University of Arizona. He began his career at Oakland University after completing his doctorate at Indiana University. His interests and publications center on foundational issues in the intersection of the philosophy of mind and cognitive science. Klappentext Naturalistic cognitive science, when realistically rendered, rightly maintains that to think is to deploy contentful mental representations. Accordingly, conscious perception, memory, and anticipation are forms of cognition that, despite their introspectively manifest differences, may coincide in content. Sometimes we remember what we saw; other times we predict what we will see. Why, then, does what it is like consciously to perceive, differ so dramatically from what it is like merely to recall or anticipate the same? Why, if thought is just representation, does the phenomenal character of seeing a sunset differ so stunningly from the tepid character of recollecting or predicting the sun's descent? J. Christopher Maloney argues that, unlike other cognitive modes, perception is in fact immediate, direct acquaintance with the object of thought. Although all mental representations carry content, the vehicles of perceptual representation are uniquely composed of the very objects represented. To perceive the setting sun is to use the sun and its properties to cast a peculiar cognitive vehicle of demonstrative representation. This vehicle's embedded referential term is identical with, and demonstrates, the sun itself. And the vehicle's self-attributive demonstrative predicate is itself forged from a property of that same remote star. So, in this sense, the perceiving mind is an extended mind. Perception is unbrokered cognition of what is real, exactly as it really is. Maloney's theory of perception will be of great interest in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science. Zusammenfassung Thought, including conscious perception, is representation. But perceptual representation is uniquely direct, permitting immediate acquaintance with the world and ensuring perception's distinctive phenomenal character. The perceptive mind is extended. It recruits the very objects perceived to constitute self-referential representations determinative of what it is like to perceive. Inhaltsverzeichnis Introduction Chapter 1: Intentionalism and Recurrent Cognitive Content Chapter 2: Intentionalism, Cognition, and Representation Chapter 3: Intentionalism's Troubles Begin Chapter 4: Intentionalism and Troubling Peculiar Perceptual Content Chapter 5: Higher Order Theory Chapter 6: Dual Aspect Theory Chapter 7: Direct Realism and the Extended Mind Chapter 8: Direct Realism and Illusion Chapter 9: Direct Realism and Hallucination Works Cited ...
