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Informationen zum Autor Pierre Asselin is Professor of History and Dwight E. Stanford Chair in American Foreign Relations at San Diego State University. His books include A Bitter Peace: Washington, Hanoi, and the Making of the Paris Agreement (2002) and Hanoi's Road to the Vietnam War, 1954-1965 (2013). He is co-editor of the forthcoming The Cambridge History of the Vietnam War, Volume III: Endings. Klappentext Communist forces in the Vietnam War lost most battles and suffered disproportionally higher casualties than the United States and its allies throughout the conflict. The ground war in South Vietnam and the air war in the North were certainly important in shaping the fates of the victors and losers, but they alone fail to explain why Hanoi bested Washington in the end. To make sense of the Vietnam War, we must look beyond the war itself. In his new work, Pierre Asselin explains the formative experiences and worldview of the men who devised communist strategies and tactics during the conflict, and analyzes their rationale and impact. Drawing on two decades of research in Vietnam's own archives, including classified policy statements and reports, Asselin expertly and straightforwardly relates the Vietnamese communist experience - and the reasons the war turned out the way it did. Zusammenfassung This book surveys the Vietnamese communist experience during the Vietnam War (1954–75) with a focus on high-level decision-making. Written in an accessible, narrative style geared toward non-experts, the book presents a history of Vietnamese communist strategy, decision-making, and policies, including key battle plans. Inhaltsverzeichnis Introduction: why Vietnam matters; 1. From Dai Viet to the August Revolution; 2. French War, 1945-54; 3. Interwar period, 1954-65; 4. American war, 1965-68; 5. American war, 1968-73; 6. Civil war, 1973-75; Epilogue. Legacies; Annotated bibliography; Index.
