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Extended Rationality provides a novel account of the structure of epistemic justification. Its central claim builds upon Wittgenstein's idea that epistemic justifications hinge on some basic assumptions and that epistemic rationality extends to these very hinges. It exploits these ideas to address problems such as scepticism and relativism.
Table des matières
PART I: MODERATISM ABOUT PERCEPTUAL WARRANTS 1. The Architecture Of Perceptual Warrants 1: The Liberal View 2. The Architecture Of Perceptual Warrants 2: The Conservative View 3. The Architecture Of Perceptual Warrants 3: The Moderate View 4. Moderates Are Legion (While Liberals And Conservatives Are Not) 5. Moderatism And The Content Of Perception 6. Summary PART II: FURTHER MOTIVATION FOR MODERATISM 1. Against Liberal Mooreanism 2. Against Entitlements 3. Against A Priori Warrants 3.1 Wedgwood And A Priori Bootstrapping 3.2 Peacocke's Rationalism 3.3 Sosa And Rational Intuitions 4. Summary PART III: THE BEARING OF THE MODERATE VIEW. TRANSMISSION FAILURES, CLOSURE, EASY KNOWLEDGE AND BOOTSTRAPPING 1. Wright's And Davies's Original Failure 2. Davies's New Failure And Its Failure 3. Another Kind Of Failure 4. Moderates, Transmission Failure 2 And Moore 5. Transmission Failure 1&2. A Compatibilist Approach 6. Transmission Failure 1&2 And Closure 7. Transmission Failures, Easy Knowledge And Bootstrapping 8. A Possible Counterexample: Pryor's (?) Failure To See This Failure 9. Summary PART IV: THE EXTENDED RATIONALITY VIEW 1. Naturalism, Pragmatism And Wittgenstein Vis-À-Vis Humean Skepticism 2. The Extended Rationality View And Humean Skepticism 3. The Extended Rationality View, Cartesian Skepticism, Closure And 'Abominable Conjunctions' 4. The Extended Rationality View And Epistemic Relativism 5. The Extended Rationality View And The Oblomovian Challenge 6. The Extended Rationality View And Truth 7. Summary PART V: THE EXTENDED RATIONALITY VIEW EXTENDED 1. The Extended Rationality View And The Principle Of The Uniformity Of Nature 2. The Extended Rationality View And The Past 3. The Extended Rationality View, Testimony And Other Minds 4. The Extended Rationality View And Basic Logical Laws 5. Summary
A propos de l'auteur
Annalisa Coliva is Associate Professor at the University of Modena and Reggio Emilia and Deputy Director of COGITO Research Center in Philosophy, Italy. Fulbright and Alexander von Humboldt Fellow, her publications include several monographs and papers in Italian and English. Among them Moore and Wittgenstein, Scepticism, Certainty and Common Sense, I modi del relativismo, Scetticismo. Dubbio, paradosso, conoscenza. As editor, she has published Mind, Meaning and Knowledge. Themes from the Philosophy of Crispin Wright, The Self and Self-Knowledge. Her forthcoming publications include The Varieties of Self-Knowledge and (with M. Baghramian) Relativism.
Résumé
Extended Rationality provides a novel account of the structure of epistemic justification. Its central claim builds upon Wittgenstein's idea that epistemic justifications hinge on some basic assumptions and that epistemic rationality extends to these very hinges. It exploits these ideas to address problems such as scepticism and relativism.
Texte suppl.
“In this interesting book, Annalisa Coliva develops
an account of the structure of justification inspired by Wittgenstein’s
epistemology, and reveals its significance for many contemporary problems. …
The book contains many important and persuasive arguments and should be of
interest to anyone interested in epistemic justification and related debates.”
(Natalie A. Ashton, The Philosophical Quarterly, pq.oxfordjournals.org,
January, 2016)
Commentaire
"In this interesting book, Annalisa Coliva develops an account of the structure of justification inspired by Wittgenstein's epistemology, and reveals its significance for many contemporary problems. ... The book contains many important and persuasive arguments and should be of interest to anyone interested in epistemic justification and related debates." (Natalie A. Ashton, The Philosophical Quarterly, pq.oxfordjournals.org, January, 2016)
