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First published in 1982, Ellery Eells' original work on rational decision making had extensive implications for probability theorists, economists, statisticians and psychologists concerned with decision making and the employment of Bayesian principles. His analysis of the philosophical and psychological significance of Bayesian decision theories, causal decision theories and Newcomb's paradox continues to be influential in philosophy of science. His book is now revived for a new generation of readers and presented in a fresh twenty-first-century series livery, including a specially commissioned preface written by Brian Skyrms, illuminating its continuing importance and relevance to philosophical enquiry.
Table des matières
Preface to this edition Brian Skyrms; Introduction; 1. Bayesianism; 2. The philosophical and psychological significance of Bayesian decision theory; 3. Bayesian decision theories: some details; 4. The counterexamples; 5. Causal decision theories; 6. Common causes, reasons and symptotic acts; 7. A general defence of PMCEU; 8. Newcomb's paradox; Appendices; Bibliography; Index.
A propos de l'auteur
Professor Ellery Eells (1953-2006) was a leading philosopher of science, best known for his probabilistic theories of causation and his decision theory. He authored and edited several books, including Probability and Conditionals: Belief Revision and Rational Decision (with Brian Skyrms, Cambridge, 1994) and Probabilistic Causality (Cambridge, 1991).
Résumé
Ellery Eells' original work examining theories of rational decision making continues to be illuminating for philosophers of science. Presented in a fresh twenty-first-century series livery, and with a specially commissioned new preface, this influential work has been revived for a new generation of readers.
