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Zusatztext Assessing the effectiveness of executive pay arrangements in providing desirable incentives presents important questions and has generated a tremendous amount of research. Making this research accessible to a wider audience, and drawing on it to discuss how pay arrangements can be improved, Too Much is Not Enough is a welcome contribution to the ongoing debates on the subject. Informationen zum Autor Robert W. Kolb is Professor of Finance and Frank W. Considine Chair of Applied Ethics at Loyola University Chicago. He has been professor of finance at the University of Florida, Emory University, the University of Miami, and the University of Colorado, and has published more than 20 books, including Lessons from the Financial Crisis: Causes, Consequences, and Our Economic Future and Futures, Options, and Swaps. Klappentext The scholarly literature on executive compensation is vast. As such, this literature provides an unparalleled resource for studying the interaction between the setting of incentives (or the attempted setting of incentives) and the behavior that is actually adduced. From this literature, there are several reasons for believing that one can set incentives in executive compensation with a high rate of success in guiding CEO behavior, and one might expect CEO compensation to be a textbook example of the successful use of incentives. Also, as executive compensation has been studied intensively in the academic literature, we might also expect the success of incentive compensation to be well-documented. Historically, however, this has been very far from the case. In Too Much Is Not Enough, Robert W. Kolb studies the performance of incentives in executive compensation across many dimensions of CEO performance. The book begins with an overview of incentives and unintended consequences. Then it focuses on the theory of incentives as applied to compensation generally, and as applied to executive compensation particularly. Subsequent chapters explore different facets of executive compensation and assess the evidence on how well incentive compensation performs in each arena. The book concludes with a final chapter that provides an overall assessment of the value of incentives in guiding executive behavior. In it, Kolb argues that incentive compensation for executives is so problematic and so prone to error that the social value of giving huge incentive compensation packages is likely to be negative on balance. In focusing on incentives, the book provides a much sought-after resource, for while there are a number of books on executive compensation, none focuses specifically on incentives. Given the recent fervor over executive compensation, this unique but logical perspective will garner much interest. And while the literature being considered and evaluated is technical, the book is written in a non-mathematical way accessible to any college-educated reader. Zusammenfassung In Too Much Is Not Enough, Robert W. Kolb studies the performance of incentives in executive compensation across many dimensions of CEO performance. Inhaltsverzeichnis Preface 1. The Magnitude and Structure of Executive Compensation The Magnitude of CEO Compensation The Structure of Executive Compensation Salary Bonuses and Long-Term Incentive Plans Restricted Stock Awards Executive Stock Option (ESO) Awards Other Forms of Compensation 2. Corporate Governance, Agency Problems, and Executive Compensation Corporate Governance Agency Theory and Incentive Alignment Corporate Governance, Incentive Alignment, and the Managerial Power Hypothesis The Levers of Managerial Power Limits to Pay on the Managerial Power Hypothesis Assessing the Conceptual Conflict Between the Agency-Theoretic and Managerial Power Views of Executive Compensation What about Ethics, Duty, and Justice? Fiduciary Duty Executive Compensation and Distr...
