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"Kaplow has produced what is likely to be recognized as the definitive work on price fixing. His analysis is rigorous, comprehensive, lucid, and convincing."
--Richard A. Posner, University of Chicago Law School"Kaplow challenges--with gusto--the very foundations of existing price fixing doctrine. Read this book with an open mind and you will come away questioning basic concepts long taken for granted in antitrust law. Kaplow's analysis is precise and devastating. Prepare to be challenged and rewarded by this brilliant and radical book."
--Carl Shapiro, University of California, Berkeley"This is an ambitious book by a renowned scholar of antitrust law and economics on one of the most important and difficult topics in antitrust. Professor Kaplow demonstrates that current antitrust law for price fixing is fundamentally flawed and provides a fascinating road map for a new approach."
--Richard J. Gilbert, professor emeritus, University of California, Berkeley"This is the most significant book on the law and economics of collusion since Richard Posner's 1976 classic,
Antitrust Law. Kaplow offers a well-conceived framework for examining the welfare impact of a price fixing regime and then uses it to produce many important insights. This provocative book will prove invaluable to scholars in economics and the law who work in the area of antitrust/competition policy. It is a must-read."
--Joseph E. Harrington, University of Pennsylvania
Table des matières
Preface xiii 1. Introduction 1 PART I: HORIZONTAL AGREEMENTS 2. Defining the Problem 21 3. Communications 50 4. Statutory Provisions and Higher Court Interpretations 69 5. U.S. Lower Court Practice 101 6. Paradox of Proof 125 7. Oligopoly Theory and the Agreement Requirement 174 PART II: PRICE-FIXING POLICY 8. Social Welfare 217 9. Framework for Decision-Making 231 10. Detection: Market-Based Evidence 256 11. Detection: Other Types of Evidence 286 12. Liability Assessment 307 13. Sanctions 322 14. Unilateral Market Power 346 15. Additional Considerations 368 PART III: COMPARISON OF APPROACHES 16. Communications-Based Prohibition 387 17. Detection of Prohibited Communications 398 18. Further Topics 420 19. Conclusion 443 References 455 Index 475
A propos de l'auteur
Louis Kaplow is the Finn M. W. Caspersen and Household International Professor of Law and Economics at Harvard University and a Research Associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research. His books include
The Theory of Taxation and Public Economics (Princeton).
Résumé
Throughout the world, the rule against price fixing is competition law's most important and least controversial prohibition. Yet there is far less consensus than meets the eye on what constitutes price fixing, and prevalent understandings conflict with the teachings of oligopoly theory that supposedly underlie modern competition policy. Competition
Texte suppl.
"I highly recommend [Kaplow's book] to economists and lawyers, as well as those working in competition policy issues than those in charge of its implementation."---David Encaoua, Journal of Economics
