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Over the last years stock options have become an integral part of the compensation of senior managers in Germany: Originating in the USA in the 1950s, this form of compensation gained increasing popularity among German corporations during the 1990s, so that by today far over 100 German listed companies grant stock option plans to their employees. Based on recent research the average German CEO ("Vor standsvorsitzender") receives approximately 10% of his salary in form of stock op tions. The ongoing globalisations of business practises as well as the boom of the Neuer Markt have been key drivers of this development. Initially, from an economic perspective the increasing importance of stock option plans in the compensation of senior managers has to be welcomed: Assuming that senior managers through their actions have the ability to influence the stock price of their companies, stock options represent a performance based type of pay that im proves the incentives to senior managers to create additional shareholder value. However, this perspective often neglects the potential costs created by such an in centive instrument. Several research studies suggest that companies in some cases generate additional costs through the granting of stock options that can exceed the benefits created by their incentive effect.
Table des matières
Tabel of contents.- 1. Introduction to the topic.- 1.1. Relevance of the topic.- 1.2. Questions posed.- 1.3. Summary conclusions.- 1.4. Outline of the structure of the book.- 2. Theoretical & empirical assessment.- 2.1. Definition of a stock option plan.- 2.2. Review of stock option plan use.- 2.3. Empirical analysis of the use of stock option plans.- 2.4. Conclusion.- 3. Review of risk-neutral valuation models.- 3.1. Importance of valuing stock options.- 3.2. Valuing stock options from the company perspective.- 3.3. Valuing stock options from the executive's perspective.- 3.4. Conclusion.- 4. Utility-based stock-option valuation.- 4.1. General introduction to expected utility models.- 4.2. Hall-Murphy model.- 4.3. Modifications to the 'traditional' EU model.- 4.4. Implications for a new model of subjective valuation.- 5. A new model to value executive stock option.- 5.1. Model specification and implementation.- 5.2. Model outputs.- 5.3. Summary of model findings and first hypotheses.- 6. Experimental test of subjective valuations.- 6.1. Purpose of the experiment.- 6.2. Experimental design.- 6.3. Experimental results.- 6.4. Implications for the valuation model.- 7. Conclusion and outlook.- 7.1. Summary conclusions.- 7.2. Future research agenda.- Appendix I.- Appendix I.
A propos de l'auteur
Dr. Florian Wolff promovierte bei Prof. Dr. Jürgen Weber am Lehrstuhl für Controlling der Wissenschaftlichen Hochschule für Unternehmensführung (WHU) in Vallendar. Er ist Unternehmensberater bei McKinsey & Company, Inc. in München.
Résumé
Over the last years stock options have become an integral part of the compensation of senior managers in Germany: Originating in the USA in the 1950s, this form of compensation gained increasing popularity among German corporations during the 1990s, so that by today far over 100 German listed companies grant stock option plans to their employees. Based on recent research the average German CEO ("Vor standsvorsitzender") receives approximately 10% of his salary in form of stock op tions. The ongoing globalisations of business practises as well as the boom of the Neuer Markt have been key drivers of this development. Initially, from an economic perspective the increasing importance of stock option plans in the compensation of senior managers has to be welcomed: Assuming that senior managers through their actions have the ability to influence the stock price of their companies, stock options represent a performance based type of pay that im proves the incentives to senior managers to create additional shareholder value. However, this perspective often neglects the potential costs created by such an in centive instrument. Several research studies suggest that companies in some cases generate additional costs through the granting of stock options that can exceed the benefits created by their incentive effect.
