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In this timely collection of essays, leading economic and communication scholars examine major policy issues confronting federal and state regulators in the telecommunications industry. The essays describe how past regulatory decisions have contributed to a growing tension between emerging competition and the preservation of specific social objectives like the continuance of universal service, and thus provide a unique perspective on the current public policy debates. Although each author discusses a different policy issue, the common theme in this volume is the compelling argument that past regulatory decisions, which were often motivated by political compromises rather than sound economic analysis, are the primary source of inefficiency that exists in the telecommunications industry today.
This insight points to potential harm that legislators may create from ignoring economic forces when deregulating an industry. The Telecommunications Act of 1996 is an example in which deregulation has created more, not less, regulatory barriers affecting competitors. The authors challenge policy makers to consider no regulation to insure that competitive forces determine prices, quantities, and quality of service for the vast array of telecommunication services available in today's marketplace.
Inhaltsverzeichnis
Introduction by Donald L. Alexander
Is It Time to Eliminate Telephone Regulation? by Robert W. Crandall
Telecommunications and Economic Development: A U.S. Perspective by Frederick Williams
Is the "Public Interest" in the Public Interest?: The Broadcast License Bargain of 1927 by Thomas W. Hazlett
The PCS Spectrum Auctions: An Early Assessment by Peter C. Cramton
The Quest for Universal Telephone Service: The Misfortunes of a Misshapen Policy by David L. Kaserman and John W. Mayo
Price Caps in the U.S. Telephone Industry: How Real is Reform? by Ronald R. Braeutigam
Index
Über den Autor / die Autorin
DONALD L. ALEXANDER is Associate Professor of Economics at Western Michigan University and adjunct scholar with the Mackinac Center for Public Policy. His research and teaching interests are in the areas of industrial organization, antitrust economics, and the economics of regulation. He is the author of several journal articles.
