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The last decade has witnessed a dramatic change in attitude towards foreign direct investment (FDI) and a significant increase in competition between governments to attract FDI as a result. These"locational tournaments"are perpetuated not simply by classical factor endowments, but also by government interventions that impact both market imperfections and FDI flows.
Based on the practical insights and experience gained in his professional work on FDI in developing countries at the World Bank, and using the EU's competition framework as an example, Stephan J. Dreyhaupt analyses whether or not a multilateral system of investment rules can be economically and politically effective. He also examines what constitutes a viable arrangement for inter-jurisdictional and inter-regional FDI governance. The author applies the framework of the New Institutional Economics analysis to the study of FDI competition to buttress the main research contention that FDI policy competition requires adequate institutional choices in order to be effective and efficient.
Inhaltsverzeichnis
Theoretical framework
Governance of foreign direct investment (FDI) policy competition in Europe
Harnessing the power of FDI competition: an EU policy agenda
Political economy aspects of FDI policy competition
Über den Autor / die Autorin
Dr. Stephan J. Dreyhaupt promovierte bei Prof. Dr. Rolf Caspers am Lehrstuhl für Weltwirtschaft und Internationales Management der European Business School, Schloß Reichartshausen in Oestrich-Winkel. Er ist als Head, Investment Information Services für MIGA, The World Bank Group, tätig.
Zusammenfassung
The last decade has witnessed a dramatic change in attitude towards foreign direct investment (FDI) and a significant increase in competition between governments to attract FDI as a result. These "locational tournaments" are perpetuated not simply by classical factor endowments, but also by government interventions that impact both market imperfections and FDI flows.
Based on the practical insights and experience gained in his professional work on FDI in developing countries at the World Bank, and using the EU's competition framework as an example, Stephan J. Dreyhaupt analyses whether or not a multilateral system of investment rules can be economically and politically effective. He also examines what constitutes a viable arrangement for inter-jurisdictional and inter-regional FDI governance. The author applies the framework of the New Institutional Economics analysis to the study of FDI competition to buttress the main research contention that FDI policy competition requires adequate institutional choices in order to be effective and efficient.
