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Cimbala and Scouras examine the issues related to the control of nuclear weapons in the early 21st century. These issues are both technical and policy oriented; science and values are commingled. This means that arguments about nuclear strategy, arms control, and proliferation are apt to be contentious and confusing. The authors seek to provide readers with a fuller, more accurate understanding of the issues involved.
They begin by analyzing the crazy mathematics of nuclear arms races and arms control that preoccupied analysts and policymakers during the Cold War. After examining stability modeling, they argue for a more comprehensive definition of strategic stability and they relate this more inclusive concept to the current relationship between the United States and Russia-one characterized by cooperation as well as competition. They then use the concept of friction to analyze how the gap between theory and practice might influence nuclear force operations and arms control. The problem of nuclear weapons spread or proliferation is then considered from the vantage point of both theory and policy. They conclude with an analysis of whether the United States might get by in the 21st century with fewer legs of its strategic nuclear triplet than weapons based on land, at sea, and airborne. A provocative analysis for arms control policymakers, strategists, and students, scholars, and other researchers involved with nuclear weapons issues.
Inhaltsverzeichnis
Introduction
First Strike Stability Modeling: The Crazy Mathematics of the Cold War
Redefining Strategic Stability
Friction and Nuclear Deterrence
Triad and Tribulation: U.S. and Russian START Options
Proliferations in an Unstable World
Conclusion
Index
Über den Autor / die Autorin
STEPHEN J. CIMBALA is Professor of Political Science at Penn State University, Delaware County. He has contributed to the literature of international relations and U.S. security and defense policy for more than 20 years, and he has written or edited more than 30 books. Among his latest publications are
Collective Insecurity (Greenwood, 1995) and
Clinton and Post-Cold War Defense (Praeger, 1996). In addition, Cimbala serves on the editorial review boards of several journals, including
Armed Forces and Society.
