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Contemporary Debates in Epistemology

Englisch · Taschenbuch

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Informationen zum Autor Matthias Steup is Professor of Philosophy at Purdue University, USA, where he is head of the Department of Philosophy. A specialist in epistemology, he is a widely published author and editor. Previous work includes A Companion to Epistemology (co-edited with Jonathan Dancy and Ernest Sosa, Wiley-Blackwell, 2010, second edition), the first edition of Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (co-edited with Ernest Sosa, Wiley-Blackwell, 2005), and Knowledge, Truth and Duty (2001).John Turri is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Waterloo, Canada. A specialist in epistemology and the philosophy of language, he has published dozens of articles on these topics in leading journals such as Philosophical Review, Noûs, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Analysis, and Philosophical Studies. He currently holds an Early Researcher Award from the Ontario Ministry of Economic Development and Innovation.Ernest Sosa is Board of Governors Professor of Philosophy at Rutgers University, USA. He has published books and articles in epistemology, including Knowledge in Perspective (1991), Epistemic Justification (with Laurence BonJour, Blackwell, 2003), A Virtue Epistemology (2007), Reflective Knowledge (2009), and Knowing Full Well (2011). Klappentext Fully updated with new topics covering the latest developments and debates, the second edition of this highly influential text retains its unique combination of accessibility and originality.* Second edition of a highly influential text that has already become a standard in the field, for students and professional researchers alike, due to its impressive line-up of contributors, and its unique combination of accessibility and originality* Twenty-six essays in total, covering 13 essential topics* Features five new topics that bring readers up to speed on some of the latest developments in the field, and give them a glimpse of where it's headed: Should knowledge come first? Do practical matters affect whether you know? Is virtuous motivation essential to knowing? Can knowledge be lucky? Can evidence be permissive?* Substantially updates two other debates: Is there immediate justification? Can belief be justified through coherence alone? Zusammenfassung Fully updated with new topics covering the latest developments and debates, the second edition of this highly influential text retains its unique combination of accessibility and originality.* Second edition of a highly influential text that has already become a standard in the field, for students and professional researchers alike, due to its impressive line-up of contributors, and its unique combination of accessibility and originality* Twenty-six essays in total, covering 13 essential topics* Features five new topics that bring readers up to speed on some of the latest developments in the field, and give them a glimpse of where it's headed: Should knowledge come first? Do practical matters affect whether you know? Is virtuous motivation essential to knowing? Can knowledge be lucky? Can evidence be permissive?* Substantially updates two other debates: Is there immediate justification? Can belief be justified through coherence alone? Inhaltsverzeichnis Notes on Contributors viiiPreface to the Second Edition xiiiPreface to the First Edition xiv1 Should Knowledge Come First? 1Knowledge First Timothy Williamson 1What Is Knowledge-first Epistemology? Trent Dougherty and Patrick Rysiew 10Experience First Trent Dougherty and Patrick Rysiew 17Knowledge Still First Timothy Williamson 22Still Nowhere Else to Start Trent Dougherty and Patrick Rysiew 252 Is Knowledge Closed under Known Entailment? 27The Case against Closure Fred Dretske 27The Case for Closure John Hawthorne 40Reply to Hawthorne Fred Dretske 563 Is Knowledge Contextual? 60Contextualism Contested Earl Conee 60Contextualism Defended Stewart Cohen 69Contextualism Contested...

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Notes on Contributors viii
 
Preface to the Second Edition xiii
 
Preface to the First Edition xiv
 
1 Should Knowledge Come First? 1
 
Knowledge First Timothy Williamson 1
 
What Is Knowledge-first Epistemology? Trent Dougherty and Patrick Rysiew 10
 
Experience First Trent Dougherty and Patrick Rysiew 17
 
Knowledge Still First Timothy Williamson 22
 
Still Nowhere Else to Start Trent Dougherty and Patrick Rysiew 25
 
2 Is Knowledge Closed under Known Entailment? 27
 
The Case against Closure Fred Dretske 27
 
The Case for Closure John Hawthorne 40
 
Reply to Hawthorne Fred Dretske 56
 
3 Is Knowledge Contextual? 60
 
Contextualism Contested Earl Conee 60
 
Contextualism Defended Stewart Cohen 69
 
Contextualism Contested Some More Earl Conee 75
 
Contextualism Defended Some More Stewart Cohen 79
 
4 Do Practical Matters Affect Whether You Know? 84
 
Practical Matters Affect Whether You Know Jeremy Fantl and Matthew McGrath 84
 
Practical Matters Do Not Affect Whether You Know Baron Reed 95
 
5 Can Skepticism Be Refuted? 107
 
The Refutation of Skepticism Jonathan Vogel 108
 
The Challenge of Refuting Skepticism Richard Fumerton 120
 
6 Are Intellectually Virtuous Motives Essential to Knowledge? 133
 
Knowledge Need Not Be Virtuously Motivated Jason Baehr 133
 
Knowledge and the Motive for Truth Linda Zagzebski 140
 
Reply to Zagzebski Jason Baehr 146
 
Reply to Baehr Linda Zagzebski 149
 
7 Can Knowledge Be Lucky? 152
 
Knowledge Cannot Be Lucky Duncan Pritchard 152
 
Knowledge Can Be Lucky Stephen Hetherington 164
 
8 Is There a Priori Knowledge? 177
 
In Defense of the a Priori Laurence BonJour 177
 
There Is No a Priori Michael Devitt 185
 
Reply to Devitt Laurence BonJour 195
 
Reply to BonJour Michael Devitt 197
 
Last Rejoinder Laurence BonJour 200
 
9 Is There Immediate Justification? 202
 
There Is Immediate Justification James Pryor 202
 
There Is no Immediate Justification Juan Comesaña 222
 
Reply to Comesaña James Pryor 235
 
Reply to Pryor Juan Comesaña 239
 
10 Can Belief Be Justified Through Coherence Alone? 244
 
Non-foundationalist Epistemology: Holism, Coherence, and Tenability Catherine Z. Elgin 244
 
Why Coherence Is Not Enough: A Defense of Moderate Foundationalism James Van Cleve 255
 
Reply to Van Cleve Catherine Z. Elgin 267
 
Reply to Elgin James Van Cleve 271
 
11 Is Infinitism the Solution to the Regress Problem? 274
 
Infinitism Is the Solution to the Regress Problem Peter Klein 274
 
Infinitism Is Not the Solution to the Regress Problem Carl Ginet 283
 
Reply to Ginet Peter Klein 291
 
Reply to Klein Carl Ginet 295
 
12 Can Evidence Be Permissive? 298
 
Evidence Can Be Permissive Thomas Kelly 298
 
Evidence Cannot Be Permissive Roger White 312
 
13 Is Justification Internal? 324
 
Justification Is Not Internal John Greco 325
 
Justification Is Internal Richard Feldman 337
 
14 Is Truth the Primary Epistemic Goal? 351
 
Truth Is Not the Primary Epistemic Goal Jonathan L. Kvanvig 352
 
Truth as the Primary Epistemic Goal: A Working Hypothesis Marian David 363
 
Index 378

Produktdetails

Autoren Sosa, Steup, Matthias (Purdue University) Turri Steup, TURRI
Mitarbeit Ernest Sosa (Herausgeber), Sosa Ernest (Herausgeber), Matthias Steup (Herausgeber), Steup Matthias (Herausgeber), John Turri (Herausgeber), Turri John (Herausgeber)
Verlag Wiley, John and Sons Ltd
 
Sprache Englisch
Produktform Taschenbuch
Erschienen 23.08.2013
 
EAN 9780470672099
ISBN 978-0-470-67209-9
Seiten 400
Serie Contemporary Debates in Philosophy
Themen Geisteswissenschaften, Kunst, Musik > Philosophie
Sachbuch > Philosophie, Religion > Philosophie: Allgemeines, Nachschlagewerke

Erkenntnistheorie, Philosophie, Philosophy, Epistemology

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