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Informationen zum Autor Alan Devlin advises Commissioner Ohlhausen on antitrust and intellectual-property matters. Previously, he was a senior associate in the San Francisco office of Latham & Watkins LLP. He has taught as an adjunct professor at the University of Chicago, University of California Hastings College of Law, DePaul University College of Law, Trinity College Dublin, and University College Dublin. His publications include Fundamental Principles of Law and Economics (Routledge 2014), as well as over thirty law-review articles. He is a graduate of Stanford Law School, the University of Chicago, and University College Dublin. Klappentext An invaluable practitioner guide to the interface between antitrust and intellectual property, examining the law in both the United States and the European Union. Zusammenfassung An invaluable practitioner guide to the interface between antitrust and intellectual property, examining the law in both the United States and the European Union. Inhaltsverzeichnis Part I: Introduction and Recent Developments Chapter 1: Antitrust and Patent Law 1: Introduction 2: Issues at the Patent-Competition Law Intersection 3: Scrutinizing Patentee Conduct: An Antitrust Challenge 4: A Roadmap for the Book Chapter 2: Important Developments in Antitrust-Patent Law 5: Actavis Rewrites US Antitrust and Patent Law 6: EU Law on Reverse Payments 7: The CJEU Limits Strategic Manipulation of the Patent System in AstraZeneca, But Retreats from an Effects-Based Approach 8: The CJEU Reigns In By Object Analysis in Cartes Bancaires 9: The Strategic Use of Standard-Essential Patents 10: Antitrust Issues Surrounding Patent-Assertion Entities Part II: The Patent and Antitrust Laws of Europe and America Chapter 3: The Patent Crisis and its Antitrust Implications 11: Introduction 12: The Patent Systems Economic Function 13: The US Patent System 14: Patent Law in Europe 15: Conclusion: How the Patent Crisis Implicates Competition Policy Chapter 4: How the EU and US Antitrust Regimes Differ 16: Introduction 17: The Different Traits, Goals, and Policies of EU and US Antitrust Law 18: How EU and US Competition Laws Diverge 19: Firms Enjoy Less Procedural Protections in Europe Part III: Understanding the Patent-Competition Law Interface Chapter 5: The Relationship between Patent and Antitrust Law 20: Evolving Views of the Patent-Competition Law Intersection 21: The Scope-of-the-Patent Theory Takes Hold 22: Dissecting the Antitrust-IP Interface and the Scope-of-the-Patent Test 23: Conclusion: Rethinking the Patent-Antitrust Relationship Part IV: Special Issues in Technology Markets Chapter 6: Market Definition, Monopoly Power, and Patented Technology 24: Introduction 25: Market Definition under US Law 26: The Relevant Market under EU Law 27: Patented Technology and Market Definition 28: Market Power under US and EU Law 29: When Does a Patent Lawfully Subsume Monopoly Power? Chapter 7: Antitrust Issues Surrounding Open and Closed Systems 30: Overview 31: When Should Antitrust Open Up Closed Networks? 32: US Law Requires a Firm to Open a System Only in Exceptional Cases 33: EU Law Requires Dominant Firms to Open a System When Viable Competition Requires It Chapter 8: The Noerr-Pennington Doctrine 34: Introduction 35: Noerr-Pennington Immunity Before the Supreme Court 36: The Lower Courts Shape Noerr-Pennington 37: Antitrust Immunity for Filing Suit in Europe Part V: Patent Hold-Up and Misuse Chapter 9: Manipulation of the Standard-Setting Process 38: Introduction 39: Standard-Setting Hold-Up 40: US Antitrust Limits on SEPs 41: Antitrust Limits on SEP Assertion in the European Union 42: Conclusion Chapter 10: Targeted Patent Aggregation 43: Introduction 44: Antic...
