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Parental Liability in EU Competition Law assesses the shortcomings of the EU doctrine of parental antitrust liability and proposes a new framework for imposing liability that is theoretically robust, effective in practice, fair in substance, and legally sound.
Inhaltsverzeichnis
- Context and Background
- 1: EU-Level Parental Antitrust Liability and the Crucial Issue of Its Legitimacy
- 2: Assessing the Legitimacy of the EU-Level Doctrine of Parental Antitrust Liability
- The Foundations of the EU-Level Doctrine of Parental Antitrust Liability: 'Undertaking' and the Imputation Process
- 3: 'Undertaking' and Its Legal Implications
- 4: Determining the Constituent Elements of an Undertaking
- 5: The Constituent Elements of an Undertaking to Which an Infringement Can Be Imputed
- The EU-Level Doctrine of Parental Antitrust Liability
- 6: The Specifics of the Doctrine: Imputing the Competition Law Violation to the Parent Company
- 7: The EU-Level Approach to Parental Liability and Its Impact on the Imposition and Construction of Antitrust Fines
- 8: The EU-Level Approach to Parental Liability and Its Interaction with Other Enforcement Policies and Doctrines
- Legitimacy as 'Justifiability': Rationalising the Existence of Parental Liability for EU Competition Law Violations
- 9: Deterrence in EU Competition Law and Its Relevance to Parental Liability
- 10: Employing Deterrence Theory to Justify Parental Liability for Competition Violations
- 11: The Applicability to EU-Level Enforcement of the Deterrence-Based Justification for Parental Liability
- Legitimacy as 'Effectiveness': The Deterrence-Based Rationale and the Specifics of the EU-Level Doctrine of Parental Antitrust Liability
- 12: The Deterrence-Based Rationale and the Scope and Substance of the EU-Level Doctrine of Parental Antitrust Liability
- 13: The Deterrence-Based Rationale and the Specific Implications of the EU-Level Doctrine of Parental Antitrust Liability
- Legitimacy as 'Fairness': The Restraining Effect of Retribution on the EU-Level Doctrine of Parental Liability
- 14: Retribution and Its Relevance to the EU-Level Doctrine of Parental Liability
- 15: The Personal Responsibility of the Parent Company for the Competition Law Violation of Its Subsidiary
- 16: EU Law and Its Consideration of Retribution under the Doctrine of Parental Antitrust Liability
- 17: A Problematic Mismatch between EU Jurisprudence on Parental Liability and Principle
- Legitimacy as 'Legality': The Restraining Impact of General Principles of EU Law on the Doctrine of Parental Liability
- 18: Parental Liability and the Principle of Ne Bis In Idem
- 19: The EU-Level Doctrine of Parental Liability and the Presumption of Innocence
- 20: Justifying in Principle the 100% Shareholding Presumption: An Alternative (Proportionality-Focused) Assessment
- Ensuring the Legitimacy of the EU-Level Doctrine of Parental Antitrust Liability
- 21: A Proposal for a More Legitimate Approach to Parental Liability in EU Competition Law
Über den Autor / die Autorin
Professor Peter Whelan is a Professor of Law at the School of Law, University of Leeds, where he is the Director of the Centre for Business Law and Practice. He has a PhD in Law from St John's College, University of Cambridge, and is a qualified US Attorney-at-Law. His work on competition law has been cited in European, African and South American judgments. He is a Non-Governmental Advisor to the International Competition Network and is a member of the United Nations Working Group on Cross-Border Cartels. To date Peter has presented his research in over thirty countries, across six continents.
Zusammenfassung
Parental Liability in EU Competition Law assesses the shortcomings of the EU doctrine of parental antitrust liability and proposes a new framework for imposing liability that is theoretically robust, effective in practice, fair in substance, and legally sound.
