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Zusatztext The particular strength of Onof's book is its exceedingly beneficial strategy of harnessing the resources of the historiography of philosophy. He expounds Kant's approach to solving the free will issue in all its perplexing difference to contemporary orthodoxies, and then shows how Kant's peculiar position manages to address various flaws of them. Informationen zum Autor Christian Onof is Honorary Research Fellow in the Department of Philosophy at Birkbeck College, UK and Reader at Imperial College London, UK. Klappentext The problem of free will is one of the oldest and most central philosophical conundrums. The contemporary debate around it has produced a range of sophisticated proposals, but shows no sign of leading to convergence. Christian Onof reviews these contemporary approaches and argues that their main shortcomings are ultimately due to paradoxical requirements on free will imposed by the naturalistic framework. Onof singles out Kant's critical solution as one that stands out among historical approaches insofar as it is based upon a rejection of this framework. By using the same methodological tool that he applies to contemporary proposals, namely a distinction between a volitional account of how we control our actions, a psychological account of the reasons for it and a metaphysical account of our status as agent, Onof shows that Kant's solution constitutes a coherent picture of free will. By exhibiting the structure running through several key publications of Kant's critical period and drawing upon unpublished notes, Onof addresses several debates which loom large in contemporary Kant literature. His exegetical work puts Kant's theory into conversation with contemporary analytic theories of free will and leads to defining a Kantian position that overcomes the issues plaguing existing approaches to the problem of free will. Vorwort A comprehensive and original treatment of freedom in Kant, bringing Kant’s theory into dialogue with contemporary research on free will. Zusammenfassung The problem of free will is one of the oldest and most central philosophical conundrums. The contemporary debate around it has produced a range of sophisticated proposals, but shows no sign of leading to convergence. Christian Onof reviews these contemporary approaches and argues that their main shortcomings are ultimately due to paradoxical requirements on free will imposed by the naturalistic framework.Onof singles out Kant’s critical solution as one that stands out among historical approaches insofar as it is based upon a rejection of this framework. By using the same methodological tool that he applies to contemporary proposals, namely a distinction between a volitional account of how we control our actions, a psychological account of the reasons for it and a metaphysical account of our status as agent, Onof shows that Kant’s solution constitutes a coherent picture of free will. By exhibiting the structure running through several key publications of Kant's critical period and drawing upon unpublished notes, Onof addresses several debates which loom large in contemporary Kant literature. His exegetical work puts Kant’s theory into conversation with contemporary analytic theories of free will and leads to defining a Kantian position that overcomes the issues plaguing existing approaches to the problem of free will. Inhaltsverzeichnis Introduction1. Free Will and Compatibilism2. Kant’s Idealism and Compatibilism3. Libertarian theories of free will4. Kant’s resolution of the Third Antinomy5. Freedom in Kant’s Practical Philosophy6. The Temporal Dimension of Free Agency7. The Kantian Solution and its RequirementsBibliographyIndex...
