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The Political Logic of Poverty Relief places electoral politics and institutional design at the core of poverty alleviation.
Inhaltsverzeichnis
Introduction; Part I: 1. Poverty relief in Latin America; 2. Poverty relief in Mexico - a geographic approach; 3. Political machines and vote buying; 4. Clientelism and the political manipulation of Pronasol; Part II: The consequences of clientelism and entitlements; 5. Improving communities - transfers and basic public services; 6. Saving lives - social programs and infant mortality rates; 7. Electoral pay-offs of antipoverty programs; Conclusion - the future of social protection.
Über den Autor / die Autorin
Alberto Diaz-Cayeros is Senior Fellow at the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law at Stanford University, California.Federico Estévez is Professor of Political Science at Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico (ITAM).Beatriz Magaloni is an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at Stanford University, California.
Zusammenfassung
The Political Logic of Poverty Relief places electoral politics and institutional design at the core of poverty alleviation. The authors develop a theory with applications to Mexico about how elections shape social programs aimed at aiding the poor. They also assess whether voters reward politicians for targeted poverty alleviation programs.
