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This book examines epistemic pluralism, a brand new area of research in epistemology with dramatic implications for the discipline. Challenging traditional assumptions about the nature of justification, an expert team of contributors explores pluralism about justification, with compelling first-order results - including analysis of the various requisites one might want to impose on the notion of justification (and therefore of knowledge) and why. It is shown why a long-lasting dispute within epistemology about the nature of justification has reached a stalemate and how embracing a different overarching outlook might lead to progress and aid better appreciation of the relationship between the various epistemic projects scholars have been pursuing.
With close connections to the idea of epistemic relativism, and with specific applications to various areas of contemporary epistemology (such as the debate over epistemic norms of action and assertion, epistemic peers' disagreement, self-knowledge and the status of philosophical disputes about ontology) this fascinating new volume is essential reading for scholars, researchers and advanced students in the discipline.
Inhaltsverzeichnis
Introduction.- SECTION I: Epistemic Pluralism: Methdological Issues.- Chapter 1: Epistemic pluralism(s), Annalisa Coliva & Nikolaj Pedersen.- Chapter 2: Epistemic pluralism from the point of view of Carnap's method of explication, Erik Olsson.- SECTION II: Epistemic Pluralism: Justification, Knowledge, and Epistemic Values.- Chapter 3: Pluralism about epistemic justification, Michael Blome-Tillmann.- Chapter 4: The plurality of justification and the solution of misunderstanding, Anne Meylan.- Chapter 5: Who wants to know?, Jennifer Nado.- Chapter 6: Epistemic goods and epistemic standings: A pluralist account, Nikolaj Pedersen.- Chapter 7: Can there be a dual aspect epistemology?, Pascal Engel.- SECTION III: Epistemic Pluralism and Epistemic Relativism.- Chapter 8: A defense of epistemic pluralism, Martin Kusch.- Chapter 9: Epistemic relativism, epistemic pluralism and hinge epistemology, J. Adam Carter.- SECTION IV: Epistemic Pluralism: Some Applications.- Chapter 10: Unity and plurality in the epistemic norms of action and assertion, Mikkel Gerken.- Chapter 11: How to be a pluralist about disagreement, Michele Palmira.- Chapter 12: A pluralistic way out of epistemic deflationism about ontological disputes, Delia Belleri.- Chapter 13: Pluralism about self-knowledge, Annalisa Coliva.
Über den Autor / die Autorin
Annalisa Coliva
is Professor in the Department of Philosophy, University of California, Irvine, US. She has published widely on the subjects of epistemology, philosophy of mind and languages and the history of analytic philosophy and is the originator of the concept of ‘hinge epistemology’. Her most recent books include
The Varieties of Self-Knowledge
(2016) and
Extended Rationality: A Hinge Epistemology
(2015).
Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen is Associate Professor at the Underwood International College, South Korea. The founding Director of the Veritas Research Center and the UIC Research Institute, his research interests include epistemology, truth, metaphysics, and philosophy of logic. His work is due to appear in the upcoming
Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology and he is currently co-editing a book entitled
Epistemic Entitlement with Peter Graham.
Zusammenfassung
Is the first edited collection solely focussed on epistemic pluralism
Investigates connections between epistemic pluralism and other epistemological paradigms
Shows how epistemic pluralism will serve to reconfigure many debates in epistemology
