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This book explains why more Jewish people survived in some German-occupied countries compared to others during World War II. Hollander demonstrates that collaborators sometimes played a surprising role in ensuring Jewish survival. Where high-ranking governing officials stayed in their countries and helped Nazi Germany, they could often "trade" their loyal cooperation in military and economic affairs for inefficient or incomplete implementation of the Final Solution. And while they sometimes did this because they had sincere moral objections to Nazi policy, they also did so because deporting local Jews was politically unpopular, because they regarded it as less important than winning the war, or because deporting Jews meant that the collaborators gave up potentially profitable opportunities to exploit them. This unique book has important implications for our understanding of state-sponsored violence, international hierarchy, and genocide, and it raises harrowing moral questions about the Holocaust and the nature of political evil.
Inhaltsverzeichnis
1. Introduction: Swords or Shields?.- 2. Scandinavia: The Banality of Goodness.- 3. Western Europe: The Politics of Judgment.- 4. Eastern Europe: The Benefits of Alliance.- 5. Conclusion: German Hegemony, State Power, and Jewish Survival.
Über den Autor / die Autorin
Ethan J. Hollander is Associate Professor of Political Science and the 2015-16 McLain-McTurnan-Arnold Research Scholar at Wabash College, USA. He conducted research for this project at the Zentrum für Antisemitismusforschung in Berlin, Germany. His research and teaching interests include Ethnic Conflict and Genocide, Comparative Politics, and International Relations. He received his PhD from the University of California, San Diego, USA.
Zusammenfassung
This book explains why more Jewish people survived in some German-occupied countries compared to others during World War II. Hollander demonstrates that collaborators sometimes played a surprising role in ensuring Jewish survival. Where high-ranking governing officials stayed in their countries and helped Nazi Germany, they could often “trade” their loyal cooperation in military and economic affairs for inefficient or incomplete implementation of the Final Solution. And while they sometimes did this because they had sincere moral objections to Nazi policy, they also did so because deporting local Jews was politically unpopular, because they regarded it as less important than winning the war, or because deporting Jews meant that the collaborators gave up potentially profitable opportunities to exploit them. This unique book has important implications for our understanding of state-sponsored violence, international hierarchy, and genocide, and it raises harrowing moral questions about the Holocaust and the nature of political evil.
