Fr. 69.00

Politics of Judicial Review - Supranational Administrative Acts Judicialized Compliance Conflict

Englisch · Fester Einband

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Informationen zum Autor Christian Adam is Assistant Professor at the University of Munich, Germany. His research focuses on policy change, policy implementation and the role of courts and litigation in these processes. He published in the Journal of Common Market Studies, Journal of Theoretical Politics, and International Journal of Drug Policy. Klappentext This book unites scholarship on law and politics with compliance research in the EU to shed light on the political role of a neglected dimension of litigation in the EU: the political role of governmental actions for annulment. The book does not portray national governments as passive actors within the EU's judicial arena. Instead it focuses on cases in which national governments turn to the Court of Justice to litigate against the European Commission, and provides several answers to the question of why EU member state governments take this decision. Governments hope, on the one hand, to evade costly domestic adjustments where the Commission uses administrative acts to interfere with domestic policy application. On the other hand, governments hope to provoke judicial law-making to influence the long-term development of EU administrative law and sectoral regulation. The book will be of particular interest to political scientists and legal scholars. . Zusammenfassung This book unites scholarship on law and politics with compliance research in the EU to shed light on the political role of a neglected dimension of litigation in the EU: the political role of governmental actions for annulment. The book does not portray national governments as passive actors within the EU’s judicial arena. Instead it focuses on cases in which national governments turn to the Court of Justice to litigate against the European Commission, and provides several answers to the question of why EU member state governments take this decision. Governments hope, on the one hand, to evade costly domestic adjustments where the Commission uses administrative acts to interfere with domestic policy application. On the other hand, governments hope to provoke judicial law-making to influence the long-term development of EU administrative law and sectoral regulation. The book will be of particular interest to political scientists and legal scholars.                                                                                                                                      .  Inhaltsverzeichnis Chapter 1. Introduction.- Part I. Tracing Causal Mechanisms: Why Governments Activate the Court of Justice.- Chapter 2. Policy Misfit and Governmental Litigation.- Chapter 3. Governmental Litigation as a form of Legal Activism.- Part II. Moving Beyond Anecdotal Evidence: The Role of Policy Misfit and Legal Activism in the EU’s State and Policy Regime.- Chapter 4. State Aid Control in the European Union.- Chapter 5. Governmental Litigation, Policy Misfit and Legal Activism in the EU’s State Aid.- Chapter 6. Conclusion.   ...

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Chapter 1. Introduction.- Part I. Tracing Causal Mechanisms: Why Governments Activate the Court of Justice.- Chapter 2. Policy Misfit and Governmental Litigation.- Chapter 3. Governmental Litigation as a form of Legal Activism.- Part II. Moving Beyond Anecdotal Evidence: The Role of Policy Misfit and Legal Activism in the EU's State and Policy Regime.- Chapter 4. State Aid Control in the European Union.- Chapter 5. Governmental Litigation, Policy Misfit and Legal Activism in the EU's State Aid.- Chapter 6. Conclusion.  

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