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Informationen zum Autor Christopher Hitchcock is Professor of Philosophy at the California Institute of Technology. His articles have appeared in journals such as The Philosophical Review, The Journal of Philosophy, Noûs, Philosophy of Science, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science , and Synthese. Klappentext Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Science features original essays on some of the most hotly debated issues in the field. Are there laws of social science? Are causes physically connected to their effects? Is the mind a system of modules shaped by natural selection? Eight central questions shape the volume, with each question treated by a pair of opposing essays. This distinctive format offers readers a unique opportunity to observe philosophers engaging in head-to-head debate. Together, the essays provide an accessible introduction to the major topics in contemporary philosophy of science, including empiricism, confirmation, realism, laws, causation, and explanation. Showcasing original arguments for well-defined positions, as well as clear and concise statements of sophisticated philosophical views, this volume is an excellent resource for professional philosophers and students alike. Zusammenfassung * Brings together fresh debates on eight of the most controversial issues in the philosophy of science. Inhaltsverzeichnis Notes on Contributors Preface Introduction: What is the Philosophy of Science? Part I: Do Thought Experiments Transcend Empiricism? 1. Why Thought Experiments Transcend Empiricism James Robert Brown, University of Toronto 2. Why Thought Experiments do not Transcend Empiricism John Norton, University of Pittsburgh Part II: Does Probability Capture the Logic of Scientific Confirmation or Justification? 3. Probability Captures the Logic of Scientific Confirmation Patrick Maher, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign 4. Why Probability Does not Capture the Logic of Scientific Justification Kevin Kelly, Carnegie Mellon University and Clark Glymour, Carnegie Mellon University Part III: Can a Theory's Predictive Success Warrant Belief in the Unobservable Entities it Postulates? 5. A Theory's Predictive Success Can Warrant Belief in the Unobservable Entities it Postulates Jarrett Leplin, University of North Carolina, Greensboro 6. A Theory's Predictive Success Does not Warrant Belief in the Unobservable Entities it Postulates André Kukla, University of Toronto and Joel Walmsley, University of Toronto Part IV: Are There Laws in the Social Sciences? 7. There are no Laws in the Social Sciences John Roberts, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill 8. There are Laws in the Social Sciences Harold Kincaid, University of Alabama at Birmingham Part V: Are Causes Physically Connected to their Effects? 9. Causes are Physically Connected to Their Effects: Why Preventers and Omissions are not Causes Phil Dowe, University of Queensland, Australia 10. Causes Need Not be Physically Connected to their Effects: The Case for Negative Causation Jonathan Schaffer, University of Massachusetts, Amherst Part VI: Is There a Puzzle about the Low Entropy Past? 11. On the Origins of the Arrow of Time: Why There is Still a Puzzle About the Low Entropy Past Huw Price, University of Edinburgh 12. There is No Puzzle About the Low Entropy Past Craig Callender Part VII: Do Genes Encode Information About Phenotypic Traits 13. Genes Encode Information for Phenotypic Traits Sahotra Sarkar, University of Texas at Austin 14. Genes Do not Encode Information for Phenotypic Traits Peter Godfrey-S...
