Mehr lesen
Informationen zum Autor Elizabeth Greenhalgh is Executive Officer at the University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra, and the Joint Editor of War and Society. Klappentext Germany's invasion of France in August 1914 represented a threat to the great power status of both Britain and France. The countries had no history of co-operation, yet the entente they had created in 1904 proceeded by trial and error, via recriminations, to win a war of unprecedented scale and ferocity. Elizabeth Greenhalgh examines the huge problem of finding a suitable command relationship in the field and in the two capitals. She details the civil-military relations on each side, the political and military relations between the two powers, the maritime and industrial collaboration that were indispensable to an industrialised war effort and the Allied prosecution of war on the western front. Although it was not until 1918 that many of the war-winning expedients were adopted, Dr Greenhalgh shows that victory was ultimately achieved because of, rather than in spite of, coalition. Zusammenfassung Imperial Germany's invasion of France in August 1914 represented a threat to the great power status of both Britain and France. This book tells the story from both British and French perspectives of how the two countries managed to create a winning coalition relationship. Inhaltsverzeichnis Introduction; 1. Coalition warfare and the Franco-British alliance; 2. Command 1914-15; 3. The Battle of the Somme, 1916; 4. The liaison services, 1914-16; 5. The allied response to the German submarine; 6. Command 1917; 7. The creation of the supreme war council; 8. The German offensives of 1918 and the crisis in command; 9. The allies counterattack; 10. Politics and bureaucracy of supply; 11. Coalition: a defective mechanism?
