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European central bank policy is already taking place today in an informal way. It comprises, in short, European exchange rate management and interest rate policy decisions within and without the European Monetary System (EMS). A focal point of such policy actions are the money market operating targets of European Central Banks. Those central bank policies appear to be dominated, however, by the Deutsche Bundesbank. This has caused recurring critical discussion of European asymmetries and German leadership in monetary stabilization pOlicies, before and after the EMS turbulences of September 1992. However, it should be pointed out that German dominance has increasingly evolved in a cooperative way, ever since the Committee of European Central Bank Governors began to meet regularly in 1964; the Basle-Nyborg accord of 1987 formed a further stage of cooperative efforts within the EMS. Presently, a small group of countries (including Benelux and Austria) generally follows, after prior 'concertation', German monetary policy patterns. In this narrow sense, there exists a European central bank policy within a "Deutsche-Mark-Zone". In a broader sense, European central bank policy is shaped, after proper consultation, by monetary cooperation between the larger EMS countries, but once again dominantly influenced by Germany; recent problems of highjnterest rates in France and elsewhere due to (relative) restrictive German monetary pOlicies are striking examples. German monetary dominance, in the narrow or broad sense, obviously creates, in the long-run, an untenable situation in the eyes of European partner countries.
Inhaltsverzeichnis
0 Introduction.- 1 Part I: Endogenous Money.- 1.1 The Money Supply Approach: Empirical Evidence for Germany.- 1.2 Endogenous Money and Interest Rates in Germany.- 1.3 The Endogeneity of Money: Concepts, Methods and Doctrinal Influence of Monetary Theory.- 1.4 Currency Competition and Endogenous Money: Experiences from the Suffolk System, 1819-1858.- 2 Part II: Towards an European Central Bank Policy Design.- 2.1 Economic Convergence and Monetary Union.- 2.2 Five Years to Prepare the Final Stage of EMU: A German View.- 2.3 Towards a Common Monetary Policy in the Transition: The Role of Ecu and Required Reserves.- 2.4 Fiscal Policy Implications of the European Union.- 2.5 The (Term) Structure of Interest Rates as a Predictor of Real Economic Growth: An Econometric Analysis for Germany.- 2.6 The Evolution of Ecu Markets.- 3 Part III: External Issues.- 3.1 Economic Transformation and the Integration of Central and Eastern Europe in the European Community.- 3.2 Convertibility in Eastern Europe.- 3.3 Exchange Rate Pegging to the Ecu in Northern Europe: A Nordic View.
Zusammenfassung
European central bank policy is already taking place today in an informal way. It comprises, in short, European exchange rate management and interest rate policy decisions within and without the European Monetary System (EMS). A focal point of such policy actions are the money market operating targets of European Central Banks. Those central bank policies appear to be dominated, however, by the Deutsche Bundesbank. This has caused recurring critical discussion of European asymmetries and German leadership in monetary stabilization pOlicies, before and after the EMS turbulences of September 1992. However, it should be pointed out that German dominance has increasingly evolved in a cooperative way, ever since the Committee of European Central Bank Governors began to meet regularly in 1964; the Basle-Nyborg accord of 1987 formed a further stage of cooperative efforts within the EMS. Presently, a small group of countries (including Benelux and Austria) generally follows, after prior 'concertation', German monetary policy patterns. In this narrow sense, there exists a European central bank policy within a "Deutsche-Mark-Zone". In a broader sense, European central bank policy is shaped, after proper consultation, by monetary cooperation between the larger EMS countries, but once again dominantly influenced by Germany; recent problems of highjnterest rates in France and elsewhere due to (relative) restrictive German monetary pOlicies are striking examples. German monetary dominance, in the narrow or broad sense, obviously creates, in the long-run, an untenable situation in the eyes of European partner countries.
