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Informationen zum Autor JEREMY LEAMAN is Senior Lecturer in the Department of European Studies at Loughborough University. His specialist research field is the political economy of modern Germany. He is author of The Political Economy of West Germany 1945-1985 ; he has co-edited two other volumes and written numerous chapters and articles on related subjects. Klappentext Until recently, central bank independence was confined to just two major capitalist countries: the USA and Germany. As a result of stagflation and the voguish espousal of neo-liberalism in the 1980s, the institution has been adopted in most OECD and in many other countries. This book questions the principle of autonomy, examining the Bundesbank in historical context and exposing the flaws in both the technical and the political case for the wholesale adoption of the Bundesbank model by other states. Zusammenfassung Until recently, central bank independence was confined to just two major capitalist countries: the USA and Germany. As a result of stagflation and the voguish espousal of neo-liberalism in the 1980s, the institution has been adopted in most OECD and in many other countries. This book questions the principle of autonomy, examining the Bundesbank in historical context and exposing the flaws in both the technical and the political case for the wholesale adoption of the Bundesbank model by other states. Inhaltsverzeichnis List of Charts List of Tables Publisher's Note Preface Acknowledgements Why is Money a Problem? Autonomy and the German Traditions of Liberalism Constituting Autonomy: From the Reichsbank to the Bundesbank Exercising Autonomy: From the 'Miracle Years' to the End of Bretton Woods 1958-1972 Towards Dominance: Central Bank Politics 1973-1982 The Emperor's New Clothes: Monetarism, Monetary Accumulation and the Blindness of Power 1982-1990 The Final Chapter: Germany, EMU and the Bundesbank Concluding Remarks Bibliography Index
Inhaltsverzeichnis
List of Charts List of Tables Publisher's Note Preface Acknowledgements Why is Money a Problem? Autonomy and the German Traditions of Liberalism Constituting Autonomy: From the Reichsbank to the Bundesbank Exercising Autonomy: From the 'Miracle Years' to the End of Bretton Woods 1958-1972 Towards Dominance: Central Bank Politics 1973-1982 The Emperor's New Clothes: Monetarism, Monetary Accumulation and the Blindness of Power 1982-1990 The Final Chapter: Germany, EMU and the Bundesbank Concluding Remarks Bibliography Index
