Fr. 239.00

Fiscal Equalization - Challenges in the Design of Intergovernmental Transfers

Inglese · Copertina rigida

Spedizione di solito entro 6 a 7 settimane

Descrizione

Ulteriori informazioni

Each endogenous variable in the model is a function of the exogenous For later discussion, it is useful to explore this in variables and parameters. more detail for one of the endogenous variables, for example the grant to State i. In this regard, one can define from (6) the per capita grant to a State as where F = [s N] is a vector of variables determined by the federal government, P = [p, p,] is a vector of the local public good prices, CGC = [I, pi c] is a vector of variables determined by the CGC and S = lq, q,] is the strategy set of the two States. Within F, the variable s is determined by the federal government. The total federal population N is determined by things such as the birth and death rate, but also by international migration and hence, to some extent, the population policy of the federal government. Within the vector CGC, the variables yi , pi, c are all determined by the CGC, while the public good provision levels within S are determined by the States. As discussed below, we assume that each State perceives s, N, public good prices and the CGC variables (except the adjustment term c) to be exogenously given. This is reasonable since in practice the States have no impact on s and only a marginal impact on the CGC variables.

Sommario

Challenges in the Design of Fiscal Equalization and Intergovernmental Transfers.- The Nature of Equalization - Objectives and Consequences.- Fiscal Capacity Equalization and Economic Efficiency: The Case of Australia.- Ensuring Inter-Regional Equity and Poverty Reduction.- The Impact of Equalization on Service Delivery.- Harmonizing Objectives and Outcomes at the National and Sub-National Levels Through Citizen Engagement and Capacity Building (With Special References to the Philippines).- Discussant Comments.- The Institutional Setting.- A Framework for Evaluating Alternate Institutional Arrangements for Fiscal Equalization Transfers.- Intergovernmental Transfers: The Funding Rule and Mechanisms.- Intergovernmental Transfers: The Vertical Sharing Dimension.- Discussant Comments.- Challenges in Implementing Equalizaton.- Expenditure-Based Equalization Transfers.- Designing Intergovernmental Equalization Transfers with Imperfect Data: Concepts, Practices, and Lessons.- A Model for Public Infrastructure Equalization in Transitional Economies.- Discussant Comments.- The Relationship of Equalization to Other Policies.- Revenue Sharing, Natural Resources and Fiscal Equalization.- The Nature and Functions of Tied Grants.- Intergovernmental Loans: Their Fit into a Transfer System.- Discussant Comments.- The Bigger Picture.- The Political Economy of Equalization Transfers.- Discussant Comments.

Riassunto

Each endogenous variable in the model is a function of the exogenous For later discussion, it is useful to explore this in variables and parameters. more detail for one of the endogenous variables, for example the grant to State i. In this regard, one can define from (6) the per capita grant to a State as where F = [s N] is a vector of variables determined by the federal government, P = [p, p,] is a vector of the local public good prices, CGC = [I, pi c] is a vector of variables determined by the CGC and S = lq, q,] is the strategy set of the two States. Within F, the variable s is determined by the federal government. The total federal population N is determined by things such as the birth and death rate, but also by international migration and hence, to some extent, the population policy of the federal government. Within the vector CGC, the variables yi , pi, c are all determined by the CGC, while the public good provision levels within S are determined by the States. As discussed below, we assume that each State perceives s, N, public good prices and the CGC variables (except the adjustment term c) to be exogenously given. This is reasonable since in practice the States have no impact on s and only a marginal impact on the CGC variables.

Dettagli sul prodotto

Con la collaborazione di Jorg Martinez-Vazquez (Editore), Jorge Martinez-Vazquez (Editore), Searle (Editore), Searle (Editore), Bob Searle (Editore)
Editore Springer, Berlin
 
Lingue Inglese
Formato Copertina rigida
Pubblicazione 12.04.2011
 
EAN 9780387489872
ISBN 978-0-387-48987-2
Pagine 502
Dimensioni 156 mm x 31 mm x 235 mm
Peso 896 g
Illustrazioni X, 502 p.
Categorie Scienze sociali, diritto, economia > Economia > Economia politica

Migration, Population, B, Organization, Entwicklungsökonomie und Schwellenländer, Strategy, Transition, Public Economics, Economics and Finance, Value-at-Risk, Options, organizations, Management science, Public finance, Development Economics, Development economics & emerging economies

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