Fr. 166.00

The Normative Claim of Law

Inglese · Copertina rigida

Spedizione di solito entro 3 a 5 settimane

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Zusatztext Bertea's level of thought organization is at the highest level: he makes explicit claims and offers explicit reasons to support them. Each chapter of his book has its main topic and argument introduced, then analyzed and, finally, summarized. Because of this, the reader can much more easily keep track of Bertea's thoughts. This is one of the most important qualities of the book. The Normative Claim of Law also has important practical implication, besides its structural quality. The discussion carried out in the book supports the conclusion that the traditional schools of legal thought have not provided a comprehensive theory of the normative claim of law. Informationen zum Autor Stefano Bertea is a Reader in Law at the University of Leicester. Klappentext This book focuses on a specific component of the normative dimension of law, namely, law's normative claim. By 'normative claim, ' meaning the claim that, inherent in the law, is an ability to guide action by generating practical reasons having a special status. The thesis that law lays the normative claim has become a subject of controversy. It has its defenders, as well as many scholars of different orientations who have acknowledged the normative claim of law without making a point of defending it head-on. It has also come under attack from other contemporary legal theorists and a lively debate has sprung up. This debate makes up the main subject of this book, which is in essence an attempt to account for the normative claim and see how its recognition molds our understanding of the law itself. This involves: (a) specifying the exact content, boundaries, quality, and essential traits of the normative claim, (b) explaining how law can make a claim so specified, and (c) justifying why this should happen in the first place. The argument is set out in two stages, corresponding to the two parts in which the book is divided. In the first part, the author introduces and discusses the meaning, status, and fundamental traits of law's normative claim. In the second section, he explores some foundational questions and determines the grounds of law's normative claim by framing an account that elaborates on some contemporary discussions of Kant's conception of humanity as the source of the normativity of practical reason. This is the first book in Hart Publishing, Oxford's new series Law and Practical Reason, which addresses fundamental issues in legal philosophy. The series will be of interest to students and scholars in moral, political, and legal philosophy Zusammenfassung This book focuses on a specific component of the normative dimension of law, namely, the normative claim of law. Inhaltsverzeichnis Introduction Part I: Essential Features Chapter 1: Meaning and Status Chapter 2: Generality and Moral Nature Chapter 3: Content-Dependence and Discursive Character Part II: Ground Chapter 4: Why Grounds are Needed Chapter 5: The Sources of the Normativity of Practical Reason Chapter 6: The Ground of the Normative Claim and Normativity of Law Conclusion Appendix: The Modified Kantian Account and Kant's Philosophy of Law ...

Dettagli sul prodotto

Autori Bertea, Stefano Bertea, Bertea Stefano
Con la collaborazione di George Pavlakos (Editore)
Editore Hart Publishing
 
Lingue Inglese
Formato Copertina rigida
Pubblicazione 06.10.2009
 
EAN 9781841139678
ISBN 978-1-84113-967-8
Pagine 316
Dimensioni 164 mm x 236 mm x 24 mm
Serie Law and Practical Reason
Law and Practical Reason
Bloomsbury 3PL
Categorie Scienze sociali, diritto, economia > Diritto > Altro

LAW / General, Jurisprudence & Philosophy Of Law, Methods, theory and philosophy of law

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