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Informationen zum Autor Scott Gehlbach is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Wisconsin, Madison. He is also a research associate of the Centre for Economic and Financial Research in Moscow, where he spent the 2007–8 academic year as a Fulbright-Hays Faculty Research Abroad Fellow, and is a recent recipient of a Social Science Research Council Eurasia Program Postdoctoral Research Fellowship. His work has appeared in numerous journals, including the American Journal of Political Science, the Quarterly Journal of Political Science, Economics and Politics, and Rationality and Society. His dissertation on the political economy of taxation in postcommunist states won the Mancur Olson Award for the best dissertation in the field of political economy. Professor Gehlbach received his PhD in political science and economics from the University of California, Berkeley. Klappentext Gehlbach challenges the conventional wisdom about the relationship between politicians and organized interests. Zusammenfassung Social scientists teach that politicians favor groups that are organized over those that are not. Gehlbach uses the postcommunist experience to suggest an alternative model of policy choice! focusing on the incentive of politicians to promote sectors that are relatively easy to tax! regardless of their organization. Inhaltsverzeichnis 1. Taxes, representation, and economic development in the Russian heartland; 2. The creation of tax systems; 3. The logic of representation through taxation; 4. Patterns of collective-goods provision; 5. Revenue traps; 6. Conclusions.
