Mechanism Design in Social Networks - 2nd International Workshop, MNet 2025, Held in Conjunction with IJCAI 2025, Montreal, Canada, August 16-22, 2025, Proceedings

This book constitutes the proceedings of the second International Workshop on Mechanism Design in Social Networks, MNet 2025, held in conjunction with IJCAI 2025, in Montreal, Canada, during August 16 22, 2025.
The 5 full papers included in these proceedings were carefully reviewed and selected from 11 submissions. They provide a cross-disciplinary study and communication on the research of mechanism design and social networks..

Sommario

.- Federated Learning with Free-Riding in a Duopoly Market.
.- Generalizing I4EA Mechanisms in Online Cooperative Games via 0-1 Decomposition.
.- Research on Link Prediction Algorithms Based on Graph Machine Learning.
.- Protecting Targets in Partitioned Networks.
.- An Experimental Study on the Fairness of Reward Allocation in Online Cooperative Games.

Riassunto

This book constitutes the proceedings of the second International Workshop on Mechanism Design in Social Networks, MNet 2025, held in conjunction with IJCAI 2025, in Montreal, Canada, during August 16–22, 2025.
The 5 full papers included in these proceedings were carefully reviewed and selected from 11 submissions. They provide a cross-disciplinary study and communication on the research of mechanism design and social networks..

Dettagli sul prodotto

• Autori: Bin Li
• Con la collaborazione di: Dong Hao (Editore), Swaprava Nath (Editore), Taiki Todo (Editore), Taiki Todo et al (Editore), Dengji Zhao (Editore)
• Editore: Springer, Berlin
• Lingue: Inglese
• Formato: Tascabile
• Pubblicazione: 02.01.2026
• EAN: 9789819551637
• ISBN: 978-981-9551-63-7
• Pagine: 89
• Illustrazioni: XX, 89 p.
• Serie: Communications in Computer and Information Science
• Categorie: Scienze naturali, medicina, informatica, tecnica > Informatica, EDP > Informatica; Artificial Intelligence, Social Networks, game theory, Auction, Matching, Social choice, distributed algorithms, mechanism design, Intelligence Infrastructure, Information propagation, Ranking System, Market Design