Emotion, Cognition, and the Virtue of Flexibility

Should emotions play a role in our decisions, even if they are "just feelings" and not necessarily "imbued with reason" or cognitively penetrated? The author shows that such basic feelings as aversion and attraction can be important normative guides by disrupting engrained habits and beliefs, enabling us to reconsider our ways, which is important due to the ever-changing nature of ethical demands on us. Therefore, these feelings should guide our decisions, even if they are not cognitive. This book fi lls a gap in the philosophy of emotions, ethics, and virtue epistemology.

Info autore

Isabel Kaeslin
, University of Fribourg, Switzerland.

Dettagli sul prodotto

• Autori: Isabel Kaeslin
• Editore: De Gruyter
• Lingue: Inglese
• Formato: Tascabile
• Pubblicazione: 30.06.2025
• EAN: 9783112214091
• ISBN: 978-3-11-221409-1
• Pagine: 178
• Dimensioni: 155 mm x 11 mm x 230 mm
• Peso: 289 g
• Illustrazioni: 2 b/w tbl.
• Serie: Practical Philosophy
• Categorie: Scienze umane, arte, musica > Filosofia; Geschichte und Archäologie, Mathematik und Naturwissenschaften, Psychology, Gefühlszustände, emotionale reaktion, PHI005000 PHILOSOPHY / Ethics & Moral Philosophy, PSY000000 PSYCHOLOGY / General, ethische Entscheidungen, ethical decisions, virtues of thinking and believing, Tugenden des Denkens und der Überzeugung, feeling states, emotional response