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Informationen zum Autor Robert J. Stainton is Associate Professor at the University of Western Ontario. He has published some 40 articles on various topics in linguistics and philosophy, and has authored or edited eight previous books, including Philosophical Perspectives on Language (1996), Knowledge and Mind (2000) and is co-editor of Philosophy and Linguistics (1999). Klappentext This volume introduces central issues in cognitive science by means of debates on key questions. Renowned experts in the field contribute to the debates from different perspectives, covering the middle ground as well as the extremes. They address such topics as the degree of modularity of the mind, the amount of innate knowledge, whether human cognition is bounded, the role of perception in action, the place of external elements in mental states, and the importance of rules and representations for explaining systematicity. The volume as a whole provides a valuable overview of the field in a clear and easily comprehensible form. Zusammenfassung * A selection of debates discussing central issues in cognitive science. * The debates are written by renowned experts in the field. * The debates cover the middle ground as well as the extremes * Addresses topics such as the amount of innate knowledge! bounded rationality and the role of perception in action. Inhaltsverzeichnis Acknowledgments vii Notes on Contributors viii Preface xiii Just How Modular Is the Mind? 1 1 The Case for Massively Modular Models of Mind 3 Peter Carruthers 2 Is the Mind Really Modular? 22 Jesse J. Prinz 3 Is the Human Mind Massively Modular? 37 Richard Samuels How Much Knowledge of Language Is Innate? 57 4 Irrational Nativist Exuberance 59 Barbara C. Scholz and Geoffrey K. Pullum 5 The Case for Linguistic Nativism 81 Robert J. Matthews 6 On the Innateness of Language 97 James McGilvray Has Cognitive Science Shown That Human Beings Are Cognitively Bounded, Or Irrational? 113 7 Bounded and Rational 115 Gerd Gigerenzer 8 Bounded Rationality and the Enlightenment Picture of Cognitive Virtue 134 David Matheson Are Rules and Representations Necessary To Explain Systematicity? 145 9 Cognition Needs Syntax but not Rules 147 Terence Horgan and John Tienson 10 Phenomena and Mechanisms: Putting the Symbolic, Connectionist, and Dynamical Systems Debate in Broader Perspective 159 Adele Abrahamsen and William Bechtel Can Consciousness and Qualia Be Reduced? 187 11 Consciousness and Qualia Can Be Reduced 189 William G. Lycan 12 Consciousness and Qualia Cannot Be Reduced 202 Brie Gertler Does Cognitive Science Need External Content at All? 217 13 Locating Meaning in the Mind (Where It Belongs) 219 Ray Jackendoff 14 The Intentional Inexistence of Language - But Not Cars 237 Georges Rey Is the Aim of Perception to Provide Accurate Representations? 257 15 Is the Aim of Perception to Provide Accurate Representations? 259 Kirk Ludwig 16 Is the Aim of Perception to Provide Accurate Representations? A Case for the "No" Side 275 Christopher Viger Can Mental States, Knowledge in Particular, Be Divided Into a Narrow Component and a Broad Component? 289 17 Can Cognition be Factorized into Internal and External Components? 291 Timothy Williamson 18 The Internal and External Components of Cognition 307 Ralph Wedgwood Index 326 ...
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Acknowledgments vii
Notes on Contributors viii
Preface xiii
Just How Modular Is the Mind? 1 1 The Case for Massively Modular Models of Mind 3
Peter Carruthers 2 Is the Mind Really Modular? 22
Jesse J. Prinz 3 Is the Human Mind Massively Modular? 37
Richard Samuels How Much Knowledge of Language Is Innate? 57 4 Irrational Nativist Exuberance 59
Barbara C. Scholz and Geoffrey K. Pullum 5 The Case for Linguistic Nativism 81
Robert J. Matthews 6 On the Innateness of Language 97
James McGilvray Has Cognitive Science Shown That Human Beings Are Cognitively Bounded, Or Irrational? 113 7 Bounded and Rational 115
Gerd Gigerenzer 8 Bounded Rationality and the Enlightenment Picture of Cognitive Virtue 134
David Matheson Are Rules and Representations Necessary To Explain Systematicity? 145 9 Cognition Needs Syntax but not Rules 147
Terence Horgan and John Tienson 10 Phenomena and Mechanisms: Putting the Symbolic, Connectionist, and Dynamical Systems Debate in Broader Perspective 159
Adele Abrahamsen and William Bechtel Can Consciousness and Qualia Be Reduced? 187 11 Consciousness and Qualia Can Be Reduced 189
William G. Lycan 12 Consciousness and Qualia Cannot Be Reduced 202
Brie Gertler Does Cognitive Science Need External Content at All? 217 13 Locating Meaning in the Mind (Where It Belongs) 219
Ray Jackendoff 14 The Intentional Inexistence of Language - But Not Cars 237
Georges Rey Is the Aim of Perception to Provide Accurate Representations? 257 15 Is the Aim of Perception to Provide Accurate Representations? 259
Kirk Ludwig 16 Is the Aim of Perception to Provide Accurate Representations? A Case for the "No" Side 275
Christopher Viger Can Mental States, Knowledge in Particular, Be Divided Into a Narrow Component and a Broad Component? 289 17 Can Cognition be Factorized into Internal and External Components? 291
Timothy Williamson 18 The Internal and External Components of Cognition 307
Ralph Wedgwood Index 326
