Fr. 130.00

Skepticism and Fallibilism

Inglese · Copertina rigida

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There are two common responses to skepticism, the claim that knowledge is non-existent and perhaps also unachievable: to succumb to it, or to dismiss it. Kvanvig shows how to avoid these responses by offering a theoretical development of skepticism, and arguing that epistemic reasoning may nevertheless approximate to the skeptical ideal.

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Jonathan L. Kvanvig is Professor of Philosophy at Washington University in St. Louis, formerly Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at Baylor University, and having held previous faculty positions at the University of Notre Dame, Texas A&M University, and the University of Missouri. His scholarly activities focus in metaphysics and epistemology, philosophy of language and logic, and philosophy of religion, including the publication of 18 books and more than 130 articles. He is the founding editor of Oxford Studies in the Philosophy of Religion and has received grants from the NEH, the John Templeton Foundation, and the Templeton Religion Trust.


Riassunto

There are two common responses to skepticism, the claim that knowledge is non-existent and perhaps also unachievable: to succumb to it, or to dismiss it. Kvanvig shows how to avoid these responses by offering a theoretical development of skepticism, and arguing that epistemic reasoning may nevertheless approximate to the skeptical ideal.

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