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Using recently released French official documents and a variety of other sources, this study explains how the French Army, so recently defeated by the Viet Minh insurgents in Indochina, was able to successfully defeat the Algerian nationalist rebels on the battlefield, while nevertheless losing the war at the conference table. This French success, between 1954 and 1962, was due in large part to the superior logistical system of the French Army and the use of the helicopter to enhance French operational mobility. French counter-mobility measures, particularly the construction of heavily defended interdiction zones on the eastern and western borders of Algeria, proved highly effective against the rebels. Such methods essentially cut off the rebel forces from their bases and from sources of supply located outside Algeria, and consequently strangled and destroyed the rebel forces within Algeria.
No other work on the Algerian War focuses upon the role of logistics in the outcome of the conflict. The detailed statistical data and comprehensive description and analysis of the logistical organizations and methods of both the French and the nationalist rebels are supplemented by excellent maps. This study also provides useful insights into the nature of the wars of national liberation and counter-insurgency doctrines that dominated military affairs in the mid-20th century.
Sommario
Preface
Introduction
The Physical Environment
The French Armed Forces in Algeria
French Logistics in Algeria: Supply and Maintenance
French Logistics in Algeria: Transportation
The Algerian National Liberation Front and Its Army
The Logistics of the Algerian Army of National Liberation
Mobility, Counter-Mobility, and Interdiction
Logistics and Mobility in Algeria, 1954-1962
Major French Combat Forces in Algeria in 1960
Characteristics of French Transport Aircraft and Helicopters
Glossary
Common French Map Symbols
Selected Bibliography
Subject Index
Info autore
CHARLES R. SHRADER is an independent historian and consultant who currently serves as the Executive Director of the Society for Military History. A Vietnam veteran, he retired from the United States Army in 1987 as a Lieutenant Colonel. He taught history at West Point, the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, and the Army War College. He also served at the NATO Defense College. His other books include U.S. Military Logistics, 1607-1991: A Research Guide (Greenwood Press, 1992), Communist Logistics in the Korean War (Greenwood Press, 1995), and The First Helicopter War: Logistics and Mobility in Algeria, 1954-1962 (Praeger, 1999).
