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Unlike statutory law, which relies on the explicit formulation of rules, common law is thought to emerge from a complex doctrine of precedential constraint, according to which decisions in earlier cases constrain later courts while still allowing these courts the freedom to address new situations in creative ways. Although this doctrine is applied by legal practitioners on a daily basis, it has proved to be considerably more difficult to develop an adequate theoretical account of the doctrine itself. Drawing on recent work in legal theory, as well as AI and law, this book develops a new account of precedential constraint and the balance achieved in the common law between constraint and freedom. This account, which involves construction of a group priority ordering among reasons, is then applied to other topics including the semantics of open-textured predicates and the practice of making exceptions to general rules.
Sommario
Introduction; 1. The reason model; 2. Exploring the reason model; 3. Some alternative models; 4. Supporting the reason model; 5. Natural reasoning; 6. Constraining natural reasoning; 7. Dimensions and magnitudes; Appendix; Index.
Info autore
John Horty is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Maryland. He is the author of three previous books as well as papers on a variety of topics in logic, philosophy, artificial intelligence, and law. His most recent book is Reasons as Defaults (2012).
Riassunto
Drawing on recent work in legal theory, AI and law, this book develops a new account of precedential constraint as well as the balance achieved in the common law between constraint and freedom and applies a theory grounded in defeasible logic to legal reasoning and legal decision-making.
