Fr. 70.00

Arguing about Metaethics

Inglese · Tascabile

Spedizione di solito entro 3 a 5 settimane

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Zusatztext 'In recent years! metaethics has been one of the most exciting growth areas in philosophy. This volume contains the most comprehensive and up-to-date set of readings currently available! and will be valued by advanced undergraduates! postgraduates! and professionals with interests in recent and contemporary metaethics.' - Alex Miller! University of Birmingham! UK Informationen zum Autor Andrew Fisher, Simon Kirchin Klappentext Arguing about Metaethics collects together some of the most exciting contemporary work in metaethics in one handy volume. In it, many of the most influential philosophers in the field discuss key questions in metaethics: Do moral properties exist? If they do, how do they fit into the world as science conceives it? If they don't exist, then how should we understand moral thought and language? What is the relation between moral judgement and motivation? As well as these questions, this volume discusses a wide range of issues including moral objectivity, truth and moral judgements, moral psychology, thick evaluative concepts and moral relativism. The editors provide lucid introductions to each of the eleven themed sections in which they show how the debate lies and outline the arguments of the papers. Arguing about Metaethics is an ideal resource text for students at upper undergraduate or postgraduate level. Zusammenfassung Arguing about Metaethics is a comprehensive contemporary collection of influential readings in metaethics today. Lucid introductions from the editors contextualise each section, making this the most up-to-date and useful anthology for the study of Metaethics at undergraduate and postgraduate level. Inhaltsverzeichnis 1. The Open Question Argument 2. Error Theory and Moral Realism 3. Moral Realism after Moore: Naturalism 4. Moral Realism after Moore: Non-naturalism 5. Expressivism 6. Expressivism and the Frege-Geach Problem 8. Expressivism and Minimalism about Truth 9. Expressivism and Non-natural Moral Realism 10. Thick Concepts 11. Judgement and Motivation 12. Humean Theory of Motivation ...

Sommario

1. The Open Question Argument  2. Error Theory and Moral Realism  3. Moral Realism after Moore: Naturalism  4. Moral Realism after Moore: Non-naturalism    5. Expressivism  6. Expressivism and the Frege-Geach Problem  8. Expressivism and Minimalism about Truth  9. Expressivism and Non-natural Moral Realism  10. Thick Concepts  11. Judgement and Motivation  12. Humean Theory of Motivation

Relazione

'In recent years, metaethics has been one of the most exciting growth areas in philosophy. This volume contains the most comprehensive and up-to-date set of readings currently available, and will be valued by advanced undergraduates, postgraduates, and professionals with interests in recent and contemporary metaethics.' - Alex Miller, Macquarie University
'The selection here is good, and quite appropriate for upper level metaethics undergraduate courses (of which there are, as the authors point out, plenty). This would be a good collection that would certainly fill a gap.' - Richard Holton, MIT
 

Dettagli sul prodotto

Autori Andrew Fisher
Con la collaborazione di Andrew Fisher (Editore), Simon Kirchin (Editore), Kirchin Simon (Editore)
Editore Routledge Academic
 
Lingue Inglese
Formato Tascabile
Pubblicazione 15.04.2006
 
EAN 9780415380270
ISBN 978-0-415-38027-0
Dimensioni 176 mm x 245 mm x 47 mm
Serie Arguing About Philosophy
Categorie Libri scolastici > Didattica > Formazione professionale
Saggistica > Filosofia, religione > Filosofia: tematiche generali, opere di consultazione

PHILOSOPHY / Ethics & Moral Philosophy, Ethics & moral philosophy, Ethics and moral philosophy

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