Ulteriori informazioni
The essays in this collection belong to the tradition of naturalism in ethics. Taken together they support the tradition's program of explaining moral thought and action as wholly natural phenomena. To this end they present studies of emotions, practical reason, moral judgment and motivation, moral ideals, and retributive justice.
Sommario
- Sources
- Introduction: Naturalism in Ethics
- 1. The Concept of Emotions in Philosophy and Psychology
- 2. William James and the Rise of the Scientific Study of Emotions
- 3. Freud
- 4. Psychopathic Resentment
- 5. Reactive Attitudes Revisited: A Modest Revision
- 6. Is Empathy Required for Making Moral Judgments?
- 7. Williams on Practical Reason
- 8. Sidgwick's Conception of Ethics
- 9. Moral Ideals
- 10. The Emotional Significance of Punishment
- 11. Punishment and Proportionality: Part 1
- 12. Punishment and Proportionality: Part 2
- Index
Info autore
John Deigh is Professor of Philosophy and Law, University of Texas at Austin. His books include
Emotions, Values, and the Law (OUP 2008),
The Sources of Moral Agency (CUP 1996), editor of
On Emotions (OUP 2013), and co-editor
The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Criminal Law. He was the editor of
Ethics from 1997 to 2008.
Riassunto
The essays in this collection belong to the tradition of naturalism in ethics. Taken together they support the tradition's program of explaining moral thought and action as wholly natural phenomena. To this end they present studies of emotions, practical reason, moral judgment and motivation, moral ideals, and retributive justice.
