Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind

Informationen zum Autor BRIAN P. MCLAUGHLIN is Distinguished Professor of Philosophy and Cognitive Science at Rutgers University. He has published numerous papers in fields including philosophy of mind, philosophy of psychology, metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophical logic. He co-authored (with Vann McGee) Terrestrial Logic: Formal Semantics Brought Down to Earth (forthcoming, Oxford) . JONATHAN COHEN is Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, San Diego. He has published widely in philosophy of perception, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, philosophy of science, and aesthetics. He is the author of The Red and the Real: An Essay on Color Ontology. Klappentext A timely collection of debates concerning the major themes and topics in philosophy of mind, fully updated with new topics covering the latest developments in the fieldContemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind provides a lively and engaging introduction to the conceptual background, ongoing debates, and contentious issues in the field today. Original essays by more than 30 of the discipline's most influential thinkers offer opposing perspectives on a series of contested questions regarding mental content, physicalism, the place of consciousness in the physical world, and the nature of perception and mental capacities.Written to appeal to non-specialists and professional philosophers alike, the second edition of Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind features five entirely new debates on the relation between perception and cognition, whether pain is a natural kind, whether perception is best understood through representational content or direct contact with the world, whether we need imagination that goes beyond imagery and supposition, and whether perceptual contents are general, particular, or a hybrid.* Presents 15 sets of specially commissioned essays with opposing viewpoints on central topics in philosophy of mind* Offers head-to-head debates on central topics such as consciousness, intentionality, normativity, mental causation, materialism, and perception* Provides a dynamic view of contemporary thinking about fundamental and controversial issues* Includes a thorough introduction providing a comprehensive background to the issues explored in each debatePart of Wiley-Blackwell's acclaimed Contemporary Debates in Philosophy series, Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind, Second Edition is essential reading for undergraduate and graduate students, academics, professional philosophers, and sophisticated general readers with an interest in the subject. Zusammenfassung A timely collection of debates concerning the major themes and topics in philosophy of mind, fully updated with new topics covering the latest developments in the fieldContemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind provides a lively and engaging introduction to the conceptual background, ongoing debates, and contentious issues in the field today. Original essays by more than 30 of the discipline's most influential thinkers offer opposing perspectives on a series of contested questions regarding mental content, physicalism, the place of consciousness in the physical world, and the nature of perception and mental capacities.Written to appeal to non-specialists and professional philosophers alike, the second edition of Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind features five entirely new debates on the relation between perception and cognition, whether pain is a natural kind, whether perception is best understood through representational content or direct contact with the world, whether we need imagination that goes beyond imagery and supposition, and whether perceptual contents are general, particular, or a hybrid.* Presents 15 sets of specially commissioned essays with opposing viewpoints on central topics in philosophy of mind* Offers head-to-head debates on central topics such as consciousnes...

Sommario

Notes on Contributors ix
 
Introduction to the Second Edition Jonathan Cohen xiii
 
Introduction to the First Edition Jonathan Cohen xviii
 
Part I Mental Content 1
 
Is There a Viable Notion of Narrow Mental Content? 3
 
1 Cognitive Content and Propositional Attitude Attributions Gabriel Segal 5
 
2 There Is No Viable Notion of Narrow Content Sarah Sawyer 19
 
Is Externalism About Mental Content Compatible with Privileged Access? 33
 
3 Externalism and Privileged Access Are Consistent Anthony Brueckner 35
 
4 Externalism and Privileged Access Are Inconsistent Michael McKinsey 50
 
Is the Intentional Essentially Normative? 63
 
5 Resisting Normativism in Psychology Georges Rey 65
 
6 Normativism Defended Ralph Wedgwood 80
 
Is There Non-conceptual Content? 97
 
7 The Revenge of the Given Jerry Fodor 99
 
8 Are There Different Kinds of Content? Richard Kimberly Heck 110
 
Part II Physicalism 131
 
Is Non-reductive Materialism Viable? 133
 
9 Everybody Has Got It: A Defense of Non-reductive Materialism Louise Antony 135
 
10 The Evolving Fortunes of Eliminative Materialism Paul M. Churchland 152
 
Should Physicalists Be A Priori Physicalists? 173
 
11 A Priori Physicalism Frank Jackson 175
 
12 On the Limits of A Priori Physicalism Brian P. McLaughlin 189
 
Is There an Unresolved Problem of Mental Causation? 213
 
13 Causation and Mental Causation Jaegwon Kim 215
 
14 Mental Causation, or Something Near Enough Barry Loewer 230
 
Part III The Place Of Consciousness In Nature 251
 
Is Consciousness Ontologically Emergent from the Physical? 253
 
15 Dualist Emergentism Martine Nida-Rümelin 255
 
16 Against Ontologically Emergent Consciousness David Braddon-Mitchell 272
 
Are Phenomenal Characters and Intentional Contents of Experiences Identical? 285
 
17 New Troubles for the Qualia Freak Michael Tye 287
 
18 A Case for Qualia Sydney Shoemaker 303
 
Is Awareness of Our Mental Acts a Kind of Perceptual Consciousness? 317
 
19 All Consciousness Is Perceptual Jesse Prinz 319
 
20 Mental Action and Self-Awareness (I) Christopher Peacocke 341
 
Part IV Perception And Mental Capacities 359
 
Should Perception Be Understood in Terms of Representation, Direct Contact with the World, or a Hybrid View? 361
 
21 Naïve Realism, the Slightest Philosophy, and the Slightest Science Craig French and Ian Phillips 363
 
22 Naïve Realism v. Representationalism: An Argument from Science Adam Pautz 384
 
23 Capacities-First Philosophy Susanna Schellenberg 406
 
Is Perception General, Particular, or a Hybrid? 431
 
24 Perceiving Particulars Christopher S. Hill 433
 
25 Abstract and Particular Perceptual Content: The Best of Both Theories Heather Logue 449
 
How Should We Understand the Distinction Between Perception and Cognition? 467
 
26 The Perception-Cognition Border: Architecture or Format? E. J. Green 469
 
27 Let's Get Rid of the Concept of an Object File Ned Block 494
 
Is Pain a Natural Kind? 517
 
28 Scientific Eliminativism for Pain Jennifer Corns 519
 
29 Pain Is a Natural Kind Matthew Fulkerson 535
 
Do We Need Imagination Over and Above Imagery and Supposition? 551
 
30 Against Imagination Bence Nanay 553
 
31 Why We Need Imagination Amy Kind 570
 
Index 588

Dettagli sul prodotto

• Autori: Jonathan Cohen, Brian P McLaughlin, Brian P. (Rutgers University Mclaughlin
• Con la collaborazione di: Cohen (Editore), Jonathan Cohen (Editore), Brian P. McLaughlin (Editore), McLaughlin Brian P. (Editore), Brian P McLaughlin (Editore)
• Editore: Wiley, John and Sons Ltd
• Lingue: Inglese
• Formato: Tascabile
• Pubblicazione: 16.02.2023
• EAN: 9781119637004
• ISBN: 978-1-119-63700-4
• Pagine: 640
• Serie: Contemporary Debates in Philosophy
• Categorie: Saggistica > Psicologia, esoterismo, spiritualità, antroposofia > Psicologia applicata; Scienze umane, arte, musica > Psicologia; Psychologie, Philosophie, Philosophie des Geistes, Kognitive Psychologie, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy, Psychology, Geistesphilosophie, cognitive psychology, Spezialthemen Philosophie, Philosophy Special Topics