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We all have ethical beliefs, such as the belief that torture is wrong. Ethical beliefs purport to guide our behaviour rather than merely to describe the world, and this creates a puzzle: What could possibly make some of these beliefs be true?
Ethical realists hold that there are ethical facts that make some of them true.
Ethical naturalists contend that these are ordinary
natural facts -- facts that are similar in all relevant respects to physical ones. This idea has seemed especially problematic. How could it be that any ordinary natural fact has the kind of
normativity -- the action-guiding nature -- that our ethical beliefs point to? David Copp answers these puzzles and argues, surprisingly, that ethical naturalism is better positioned to explain the nature of normativity than its alternatives.
Sommario
- 1. Introduction: The Problem of Normativity
- 2. What is Normativity?
- 3. A Categorization of Theories of Normativity
- 4. Ethical Realism
- 5. Some Alternatives to Ethical Naturalism
- 6. Naturalism I: Natural Properties
- 7. Naturalism II: Structural Varieties
- 8. Naturalism III: Substantive Varieties
- 9. Objections and Replies
- 10. The Problem of Normativity
Info autore
David Copp is Distinguished Professor of Philosophy, Emeritus, at the University of California, Davis. He is author of Morality, Normativity, and Society (1995) and Morality in a Natural World (2007), and he edited The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory (2006). He served on the editorial boards of Ethics and the Canadian Journal of Philosophy.
Riassunto
We all have ethical beliefs. We may believe, for example, that torture is wrong, that compassion is a virtue, and that it is rational to promote what one values. These beliefs are normative; they concern what we ought or ought not to do, or what is valuable or worthy of our choosing, or what a society must try to guarantee. The problem of normativity is to explain what the normativity of these beliefs comes to. What is it for an ethical claim, an ethical judgment, or an ethical fact to be normative? All of the main problems in metaethics can be traced back to the problem of normativity. They arise in the form they do because ethics is normative.
Ethical realists hold that there are ethical facts that are the truth-makers of ethical beliefs -- facts such as the fact that torture is wrong -- facts that are similar in all metaphysically and epistemologically important respects to biological, psychological, and physical ones. Ethical realism faces a variety of objections, but the most important is its purported inability to account for the normativity of the ethical facts that it postulates. Some philosophers think that the normativity objection poses an especially acute challenge to ethical naturalism because of its view that the ethical properties and facts are natural ones. David Copp aims to explain the naturalist's position, why it is important, and why we might find it plausible despite the objections it faces. He argues that, in fact, ethical naturalism is better positioned to answer the normativity objection, and to explain the nature of normativity, than its alternatives.
