Epistemic Defeat - A Treatment of Defeat as an Independent Phenomenon

A number of well-developed theories shed light on the question, under what circumstances our beliefs enjoy epistemic justification. Yet, comparatively little is known about epistemic defeat-when new information causes the loss of epistemic justification. This book proposes and defends a detailed account of epistemic defeaters. The main kinds of defeaters are analyzed in detail and integrated into a general framework that aims to explain how beliefs lose justification. It is argued that defeaters introduce incompatibilities into a noetic system and thereby prompt a structured re-evaluation process that makes a justified reinstatement of the defeated belief impossible. The account is then applied to the topic of disagreement, where it is used in an argument for conciliationism, as well as a new explanation for higher-order defeat. Throughout the book, the notion of defeat is the center of attention, while a number of new issues are discussed at the intersections of defeat and justification. Specifically, new problems are raised for broadly internalist accounts of defeat, a fully descriptive reliabilist account of defeat is provided, and the case for normative defeat is revisited.

Info autore

Jan Constantin, University of Cologne, Cologne.

Dettagli sul prodotto

• Autori: Jan Constantin
• Editore: De Gruyter
• Lingue: Inglese
• Formato: Tascabile
• Pubblicazione: 08.05.2023
• EAN: 9783111269993
• ISBN: 978-3-11-126999-3
• Pagine: 287
• Dimensioni: 155 mm x 17 mm x 230 mm
• Peso: 449 g
• Illustrazioni: 2 b/w tbl.
• Serie: Epistemische Studien / Epistemic Studies; ISSN; Epistemic Studies, 47
• Categorie: Saggistica > Filosofia, religione > Filosofia: dall'antichità ai giorni nostri; Scienze umane, arte, musica > Filosofia > XX° e XXI° secolo