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Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind Volume 3

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Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind presents cutting-edge work in the philosophy of mind, combining invited articles and articles selected from submissions.

Sommario










  • I. Mind and Science

  • 1: Sara Aronowitz: The Parts of an Imperfect Agent

  • 2: Henry Cowles and Joshua Knobe: The Average isn't Normal

  • 3: Gabriel Dupre: Correspondence and Construction: The Representational Theory of Mind and Internally-Driven Classificatory Schemes

  • 4: Gabbrielle Johnson: Bias and the Domain of Consciousness

  • 5: Preston Lennon: Aphantasia and Conscious Thought

  • 6: Maja Spener: The Introspective Method

  • II. Sensory Experience: Perception, Imagination, Pleasure

  • 7: Dorothea Debus: Right Here, Right Now: On the Eudaimonic Value of Perceptual Awareness

  • 8: Justin D'Amrbosio and Daniel Stoljar: Imagination, Fiction, and Perspectival Displacement

  • 9: Daniel Pallies and Alexander Dietz: The Dilemma for Attitude Theories of Pleasure

  • 10: Davide Bordini: Seeing through Transparency

  • III. Book Symposium on David Papineau s The Metaphysics of Sensory Experience

  • 11: David Papineau: Précis of The Metaphysics of Sensory Experience

  • 12: Alex Byrne: Papineau on Sensory Experience

  • 13: Angela Mendelovici: Truth and Content in Sensory Experience

  • 14: Adam Pautz: An Argument Against Papineau s Qualitative View of Sensory Experience

  • 15: David Papineau: Responses to Mendelovici, Pautz and Byrne

  • IV. History of Philosophy of Mind: Cavendish and Strong

  • 16: David Cunning: Cavendish and Strawson on Emergence, Mind, and Self

  • 17: Alison Peterman: 'Actions of a Body Sentient': Cavendish on the Mind (and against Panpsychism)

  • 18: Galen Strawson: C. A. Strong: Real Materialism, Evolutionary Naturalism, Panpsychism



Info autore

Uriah Kriegel is Professor of Philosophy at Rice University. He is the author of Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory (OUP, 2009), The Sources of Intentionality (OUP, 2011), The Varieties of Consciousness (OUP, 2015), and Brentano's Philosophical System: Mind, Being, Value (OUP, 2018).

Riassunto

Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind presents cutting-edge work in the philosophy of mind, combining invited articles and articles selected from submissions.

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