Emotion As Feeling Towards Value - A Theory of Emotional Experience

Much of what we take to be meaningful and significant in life is inextricably linked with our capacity to experience emotions. Here, Jonathan Mitchell considers emotional experiences as sui generis states to be given their own place within our mental economy, and proposes an original view of emotional experiences as feelings-towards-values.

Sommario

• Introduction


• 1: Experiential Modes and Face Value Contents (a framework)


• 2: The Evaluative Content View of Emotional Experience


• 3: The Content Priority View


• 4: The Nature of Emotional Experience


• 5: The Role of the Body and Action-Readiness


• 6: The Intelligibility of Emotional Experience


• Conclusion

Info autore

Jonathan Mitchell is a British Academy Post-Doctoral Fellow at the University of Manchester. He received his PhD in philosophy from the University of Warwick, and previously studied philosophy at the University of Sheffield. He was also the holder of a Global Excellence Stature Post-Doctoral Research Fellowship at the University of Johannesburg. His research focuses on the intersection between phenomenology, philosophy of mind, emotion, and value.

Riassunto

Much of what we take to be meaningful and significant in life is inextricably linked with our capacity to experience emotions. Here, Jonathan Mitchell considers emotional experiences as sui generis states to be given their own place within our mental economy, and proposes an original view of emotional experiences as feelings-towards-values.

Testo aggiuntivo

Jonathan Mitchell's Emotion as Feeling towards Value is a sustained and careful defense of an intriguing theory of emotion as a distinctive kind of evaluative representation... Emotion as Feeling towards Value constitutes a prime example of patient, rigorous, intellectually honest philosophy of emotion.

Dettagli sul prodotto

• Autori: Mitchell, Jonathan Mitchell, Jonathan (British Academy Post-Doctoral Mitchell, Jonathan (British Academy Post-Doctoral Fellow Mitchell, Jonathan (University of Manchester) Mitchell
• Editore: Oxford University Press
• Lingue: Inglese
• Formato: Copertina rigida
• Pubblicazione: 30.09.2021
• EAN: 9780192846013
• ISBN: 978-0-19-284601-3
• Pagine: 226
• Categorie: Saggistica > Filosofia, religione > Filosofia: tematiche generali, opere di consultazione; Scienze umane, arte, musica > Filosofia > Tematiche generali, enciclopedie; PHILOSOPHY / Mind & Body, Philosophy of Mind, PHILOSOPHY / Movements / Utilitarianism, PSYCHOLOGY / Cognitive Psychology & Cognition, Psychology: emotions, Ethics & moral philosophy, Ethics and moral philosophy