Institutional Constraints and Policy Choice - An Exploration of Local Governance

Demonstrates how governmental structure and institutional rules determine who gets what in American cities.
Institutional arrangements constitute the "rules of the game" for any civil and political society. To understand urban politics and policy making, including issues dealing with economic development, zoning, constituency representation, government borrowing, and service contract decisions, discovering institutional regularities is key. To achieve this the authors combine older institutional approaches emphasizing formal structure and governance organizations with newer approaches and transaction cost theory. Institutional Constraints and Policy Choice contends that institutional arrangements both shape and are shaped by human behavior, and when combined with contextual factors and the uncertainty associated with leadership turnover provide the basis of understanding how decisions are made at the level of local government.

Info autore

James C. Clingermayer is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Northern Kentucky University.
Richard C. Feiock is Professor of Public Administration and Policy at Florida State University.

Dettagli sul prodotto

• Autori: James C Clingermayer, James C. Clingermayer, Richard C Feiock, Richard C. Feiock
• Editore: State University of New York Press
• Lingue: Inglese
• Formato: Copertina rigida
• Pubblicazione: 12.04.2001
• EAN: 9780791449134
• ISBN: 978-0-7914-4913-4
• Pagine: 164
• Dimensioni: 156 mm x 235 mm x 16 mm
• Peso: 336 g
• Serie: Suny Public Administration
• Categoria: Scienze sociali, diritto, economia > Scienze politiche > Scienze politiche e cittadinanza attiva