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Dangerous Art takes up the problem of judging works of art using moral standards. When we think that a work is racist, or morally dangerous, what do we mean? James Harold approaches the topic from two angles. First, he takes up the moral question on its own. What could it mean to say that a work of art (rather than, say, a human being) is immoral? He then steps back and examines how moral evaluation fits into the larger task of evaluating artworks. If an artwork is immoral, what does that tell us about how to value the artwork? By tackling the issue from both sides, Harold demonstrates how many of the reasons previously given for thinking that works of art are immoral do not stand up to careful scrutiny. While many philosophers of art have simply assumed that artworks can be evaluated morally and proceeded as though such assessments were unproblematic, Harold highlights the complexities and difficulties inherent in such evaluations. He argues that even when works of art are rightly condemned from a moral point of view, the relationship between that moral flaw and their value as artworks is complex. He instead defends a moderate, skeptic version of autonomism between morality and aesthetics. Employing figures and ideas from ancient Greece, classical China, and the Harlem Renaissance, as well as William Styron's novel The Confessions of Nat Turner, he argues that we cannot judge artworks in the same way that we judge people on moral grounds. In this sense, we can judge an artwork to be both wicked and beautiful; nothing requires us to judge an artwork more or less valuable aesthetically just because we judge it to be morally bad or good. Taking up complex issues at the intersection of art and ethics, Dangerous Art will appeal to philosophers and students interested in art, aesthetics, moral philosophy, and philosophy of mind.
Sommario
- Preface
- Acknowledgements
- Introduction
- Chapter 1: Morality and art: a little history
- I. Music in classical China
- II. Poetry in ancient Greece
- III. Art and propaganda in the Harlem Renaissance
- IV. Conclusions
- Chapter 2: Does art change us?
- I. The prima facie case that art can change us morally
- II. Evaluating art, but not its effects
- III. Further considerations
- Chapter 3: Wicked artists
- I. Objections
- II. Moral taint
- III. Artworks and moral communities
- IV. Related questions: virtuous artists, immoral production, and identity injustice
- Chapter 4: Art and moral understanding
- I. Propositional moral knowledge
- II. Going to art and seeking knowledge
- III. Non-propositional accounts of moral learning
- IV. Corrupting our moral understanding
- V. Conclusions
- Chapter 5: Artworks and persons
- Chapter 6: From relativism to expressivism
- I. Value scheme relativism
- II. Locke's value theory
- III. Feeling and value
- IV. The expressivist's answer to the relativist
- Chapter 7: An expressivist account of the differences between aesthetic and moral judgments
- I. Candidate differences between aesthetics and morality
- II. Two further differences
- III. Moral particularism
- IV. Conclusion
- Chapter 8: Should moral judgments affect aesthetic judgments (or the other way around)?
- I. Defining autonomism
- II. The no-error argument
- III. Four objections
- IV. Conclusion
- Chapter 9: Conclusions and illustrations
- I. Moral criticisms of groups of works
- II. Moral criticisms of individual works
- III. A little history, revisited
Info autore
James Harold is Professor of Philosophy at Mount Holyoke College.
Riassunto
What grounds a judgment that a work of art is immoral? This book argues that we cannot judge artworks morally in the same way that we judge people. What’s more, there is no direct influence from moral judgments to aesthetic judgments: it is possible for artworks to be both immoral and beautiful.
Testo aggiuntivo
...Harold's book is essential reading for anyone interested in the moral criticism of art. Harold's approach to the issue is notable...
