Constraining Dictatorship - From Personalized Rule to Institutionalized Regimes

Examining constitutional rules and power-sharing in Africa reveals how some dictatorships become institutionalized, rule-based systems.

Sommario

1. Introduction; 2. Why do leaders institutionalize?; 3. Two illustrative cases; 4. How should institutionalization be measured?; 5. What are the causes of regime institutionalization?; 6. What are the consequences of institutionalization on autocratic durability?; 7. What are the consequences of institutionalization on leadership succession?; 8. Conclusion; References; Index.

Info autore

Anne Meng is Assistant Professor in the Department of Politics, University of Virginia. Her research centers on authoritarian politics and institutions. Professor Meng's work has been published in the British Journal of Political Science, The Journal of Theoretical Politics, Columbia Law Review, and Studies in Comparative International Development, and has won the 'Best Paper Award' from the Democracy and Autocracy section at APSA.

Riassunto

By examining the emergence of constitutional rules and power-sharing in Africa, Meng explains how some dictatorships become institutionalized, rule-based systems. This book is of interest to scholars of African and comparative politics studying political economy, formal theory, democratization, comparative constitutions, and presidential power.

Dettagli sul prodotto

• Autori: Meng Anne Meng, Anne Meng, Anne (University of Virginia) Meng
• Editore: Cambridge University Press ELT
• Lingue: Inglese
• Formato: Copertina rigida
• Pubblicazione: 31.08.2020
• EAN: 9781108834896
• ISBN: 978-1-108-83489-6
• Pagine: 264
• Serie: Political Economy of Instituti; Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions
• Categorie: Scienze sociali, diritto, economia > Scienze politiche > Scienze politiche e cittadinanza attiva; POLITICAL SCIENCE / American Government / General, Comparative Politics, African History