Ulteriori informazioni
Sommario
1. Introduction: the global competition for capital meets local politics; 2. A theory of the political use of investment incentives; 3. Incentives and the competition for investment within countries and around the world; 4. The economic case against investment incentives; 5. Economic or political competition? Allocation and oversight of US incentives; 6. Money for money: campaign contributions in exchange for financial incentives?; 7. Political pandering in the United States: a survey experiment on incentives and investment; 8. Pandering upward: tax incentives and credit claiming in authoritarian countries; 9. The distributional effects of investment incentives; 10. Potential policy solutions to the pandering problem; 11. Final thoughts.
Info autore
Nathan M. Jensen is Professor of Government at the University of Texas, Austin. His research focusses on government economic development strategies, firm non-market strategies and business-government relations, as well as the politics of oil and natural resources, political risk in emerging markets, trade policy, and international institutions.Edmund J. Malesky is a Professor of Political Economy and the Associate Chair of the Political Science Department at Duke University, North Carolina. He is a noted specialist in economic development, authoritarian institutions, and comparative political economy in Vietnam and has published extensively in leading political science and economic journals.
Riassunto
A rigorous analysis of fiscal incentives, arguing that politicians choose to employ economically inefficient policies to claim credit for economic development. This book will be of interest to researchers and teachers in the fields of political science, economics, public policy, urban development and management.
