Ulteriori informazioni
In thinking about ontology as the study of being or what fundamentally exists, we can adopt an ontology that either takes substances or processes as primary. There are, however, both commonsense and naturalistic reasons for not fully adopting a substance ontology, which indicate that we ought to suspend judgment with respect to the acceptance of a substance ontology. Doing so allows room to further explore other ontologies. In this book, Andrew M. Winters argues that there are both commonsense and naturalistic reasons for further pursuing a process ontology. Adopting a process ontology allows us to overcome many of the difficulties facing a substance ontology while also accommodating many of the phenomenon that substance ontologies were appealed to for explanation. Given these reasons, we have both commonsense and naturalistic reasons for pursuing and developing a metaphysics without substance.
Sommario
1. Introduction: Ontological Frameworks.- 2. A Substance Metaphysics Primer.- 3. Commonsense Problems with Substance.- 4. Naturalistic Problems with Substance.- 5. Attenuated Methodological Naturalism.- 6. Metaphysics Without Substance.- 7. Conclusion: The Direction of Process Metaphysics.
Riassunto
Serves as the foundation for understanding how a metaphysics that takes processes as primary may be preferable to the traditional substance ontologies
Situates discussion in the analytical tradition
Argues for a historical, conceptual, and naturalistic reasoning for pursuing process metaphysics
Relazione
"Winters (Slippery Rock Univ.) argues that process metaphysics, a competitor to substance metaphysics largely marginalized in mainstream analytic philosophy, deserves more attention as an alternative framework for approaching natural explanation. ... Summing Up: Recommended. Upper-division undergraduates through faculty." (D. A. Forbes, Choice, Vol. 55 (9), May, 2018)
