Ulteriori informazioni
Zusatztext The book offers novel insights into the unique role that the United States has played in stabilizing international financial crises, while also shedding light on the limitations of the IMF to act as an ILLR. McDowell's writing style is clear and easy to comprehend for both experts and nonexperts alike, and the book's rich case studies help provide useful context to key findings discovered in the statistical analyses. Informationen zum Autor Daniel McDowell is Assistant Professor of Political Science, Syracuse University. Klappentext Brother, Can You Spare a Billion? explores how and why the U.S. has regularly acted, often alongside the IMF, as an international lender of last resort by selectively bailing out foreign economies in crisis. Daniel McDowell highlights the unique role that the U.S. has played in stabilizing the world economy from the 1960s through 2008. Zusammenfassung Brother, Can You Spare a Billion? explores how and why the U.S. has regularly acted, often alongside the IMF, as an international lender of last resort by selectively bailing out foreign economies in crisis. Daniel McDowell highlights the unique role that the U.S. has played in stabilizing the world economy from the 1960s through 2008. Inhaltsverzeichnis Table of Contents Table of Figures Table of Tables Preface List of Abbreviations CHAPTER 1 - Introduction 1. THE PUZZLE 2. THE ARGUMENT 3. PLAN OF THE BOOK and FINDINGS CHAPTER 2 - The ILLR in Theory and Practice 1. AN INTERNATIONAL LLR: A BRIEF HISTORY OF A CONCEPT 1.1 The ILLR and the Hegemon 1.2 The ILLR and the IMF 2. THE IMF'S LIMITATIONS AS ILLR 2.1. The Problem of Unresponsiveness 2.2. The Problem of Resource Insufficiency 3. THE UNITED STATES' ILLR MECHANISMS 3.1. The Mechanics of Currency Swaps 3.2. Speed and Independence 3.3. Lending Capacity 3.4. Division of Labor 4. CONCLUSIONS CHAPTER 3 - The United States Invents its Own ILLR, 1961-1962 1. MORE DOLLARS, MORE PROBLEMS 1.1 From Dollar Gap to Dollar Glut 1.2. Two Threats: The "Gold Drain" and Speculation 2. IN SEARCH OF AN ILLR 2.1. The General Arrangements to Borrow 3. AN ALTERNATIVE ILLR: CENTRAL BANK CURRENCY SWAPS 3.1. The Fed's Novel Idea 3.2. Who Needs the IMF? 3.3. How the Swap Lines Protected U.S. Interests 3.4. Why did Europe Cooperate? 4. CONCLUSIONS CHAPTER 4 - The Exchange Stabilization Fund and the IMF in the 1980s and 1990s 1. THE EXCHANGE STABILIZATION FUND 2. 1980s: GLOBAL BANKING AND THE DEBT CRISIS 2.1. The IMF's "Concerted Lending" Strategy and the Problem of Unresponsiveness 2.2. The ESF and "Bridge Loans": Correcting for the Problem of IMF Unresponsiveness 3. 1990s: PORTFOLIO FLOWS AND CAPITAL ACCOUNT CRISES 3.1. Capital Account Crises and IMF Resource Insufficiency 3.2. The ESF and Supplemental Loans: Correcting for the Problem of IMF Resource Insufficiency 4. CONCLUSIONS CHAPTER 5 - Who's In, Who's Out, and Why? Selecting Whom to Bailout, 1983-1999 1. U.S. FINANCIAL INTERESTS AND ESF BAILOUT SELECTION 2. AN EMPIRICAL MODEL OF ESF BAILOUT SELECTION 3. RESULTS 4. CONCLUSIONS CHAPTER 6 - U.S. International Bailouts in the 1980s and 1990s 1. CASE SELECTION 2. THE CASES 2.1. Mexico, Brazil and Argentina, 1982-1983 2.2. Argentina, 1984 2.3. Poland, 1989 2.4. Mexico, 1995 2.5. Thailand, 1997 2.6. Indonesia and South Korea, 1997 2.7. Declining Use: The ESF is Put Out to Pasture 3. CONCLUSIONS CHAPTER 7 - The United States as ILLR during the Great Panic of 2008-2009 1. BACKGROUND: "A NOVEL ASPECT" OF THE GREAT PANIC OF 2008 2. U.S. FINANCIAL INTERESTS AND THE FED'S ILLR ACTIONS 3. AN EMPIRICAL MODEL OF FED SWAP LINE SELECTION 4. THE INTEREST RATE THREAT AND THE FED'S ILLR ACTIONS 5. TRANSCRIPT ANALYSIS OF FOMC MEETI...
