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Zusatztext Embodied Selves and Divided Minds examines the ways in which research in cognition, in particular embodied cognition, can illuminate our understanding of psychiatry and psychopathology. The detailed argumentation and reference to previous works, makes the book a rich source for those interested not only in the dialogue between philosophy and psychiatry, but also in the philosophy of mind more generally. Furthermore, the book serves as a good example of the ways in which phenomenology and philosophy of science can work hand in hand ... The appeal of the book to such a wide range of audience is amplified by the holistic approach to the topic taken by Maiese ... an invaluable addition to the International Perspectives in Philosophy and Psychiatry series. Informationen zum Autor Michelle Maiese is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Emmanuel College in Boston, Massachusetts. She earned her B.A. in Philosophy and English Literature from Northwestern University and her Ph.D. in Philosophy from the University of Colorado, Boulder. Maiese's research focuses on issues in philosophy of mind, philosophy of psychiatry, and the emotions. In particular, she is interested in embodied cognition, enactivism, the integration of emotion and cognition, and the nature of psychopathology. Her previous books include Embodied Minds in Action (co-authored with Robert Hanna, 2009) and Embodiment, Emotion and Cognition (2011). Klappentext Embodied Selves and Divided Minds examines how research in embodied cognition and enactivism can contribute to our understanding of the nature of self-consciousness, the metaphysics of personal identity, and the disruptions to self-awareness that occur in case of psychopathology.It begins with the assumption that if we take embodiment seriously, then the resulting conception of the self (as physically grounded in the living body) can help us to make sense of how a minded subject persists across time. However, rather than relying solely on puzzle cases to discuss diachronic persistence and the sense of self, this work looks to schizophrenia and dissociative identity disorder as case studies. Here we find real-life examples of anomalous phenomena that signify disruptions to embodied self-experience and appear to indicate a fragmentation of the self. However, rather than concluding that these disorders count as genuine instances of multiplicity, the book's discussion of the self and personal identity allows us to understand the characteristic symptoms of these disorders as significant disruptions to self-consciousness. The concluding chapter then examines the implications of this theoretical framework for the clinical treatment of schizophrenia and dissociative identity disorder.Embodied Selves and Divided Minds reveals how a critical dialogue between Philosophy and Psychiatry can lead to a better understanding of important issues surrounding self-consciousness, personal identity, and psychopathology. Zusammenfassung Embodied Selves and Divided Minds examines how research in embodied cognition and enactivism can contribute to our understanding of the nature of self-consciousness, the metaphysics of personal identity, and the disruptions to self-awareness that occur in case of psychopathology. It begins with the assumption that if we take embodiment seriously, then the resulting conception of the self (as physically grounded in the living body) can help us to make sense of how a minded subject persists across time. However, rather than relying solely on puzzle cases to discuss diachronic persistence and the sense of self, this work looks to schizophrenia and dissociative identity disorder as case studies. Here we find real-life examples of anomalous phenomena that signify disruptions to embodied self-experience and appear to indicate a fragmentation of the self. However, rather than concluding that these disorders count as genuine instances of multiplicity, the book's...
