Organization With Incomplete Information - Essays in Economic Analysis: A Tribute to Roy Radner

Zusammenfassung This collection contains essays that provide definitive and accessible accounts of recent research on some of the most important topics in the theory of decision-making and organization-design with incomplete information. Aimed primarily at non-specialists! some of the essays indicate the limitations of accepted paradigms and suggest directions of future research. Inhaltsverzeichnis Introduction: searching for paradigms Mukul Majumdar; 1. Equilibrium with incomplete markets in a sequence economy Wayne Shafer; 2. The existence of rational expectations equilibrium: a retrospective Beth Allen and James S. Jordan; 3. Rational expectations and rational learning Lawrence E. Blume and David Easley; 4. Dynamic games in organizational theory Roy Radner; 5. The equilibrium existence problem in general Markovian games Prajit Dutta and Rangarajan Sundaram; 6. A practical person's guide to mechanism selection: some lesson from experimental economics Andrew Schotter; 7. Organizations with an endogenous number of information processing agents Timothy Van Zandt; 8. A modular network model of bounded rationality Kenneth R. Mount and Stanley Reiter.

Dettagli sul prodotto

• Autori: Mukul Majumdar, Mukul (Cornell University Majumdar
• Con la collaborazione di: Mukul Majumdar (Editore)
• Editore: Cambridge University Press ELT
• Lingue: Inglese
• Formato: Tascabile
• Pubblicazione: 14.10.2008
• EAN: 9780521084666
• ISBN: 978-0-521-08466-6
• Pagine: 364
• Categoria: Scienze sociali, diritto, economia > Economia > Economia politica